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Abstract:	 Myanmar's	 recently	 opened	 economy	 is	 flush	 with	 incoming	 investment	 and	 activity.	 World	
leaders	advocate	that	all	businesses	entering	the	country	must	operate	in	a	"socially	responsible	manner."	
However,	the	history	of	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	in	Myanmar	is	undefined,	contradictory,	and	
complex.	 Thus,	 to	 get	 a	 handle	 around	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 “responsible,”	 this	 paper	 investigates	 the	
collective	way	in	which	actors	in	the	petroleum	industry	in	Myanmar	enact	CSR	from	1990	to	2014.	The	oil	
and	 gas	 (O&G)	 industry	 is	 the	most	 lucrative,	 and	 arguably	 powerful,	 national	 sector.	 The	 practice	 and	
philosophy	 of	 CSR,	which	 originated	 in	 this	 industry,	 is	 now	proclaimed	 to	 be	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 this	
newly	charted	course	of	responsible	business	in	Myanmar.	Yet,	activists	and	critics	maintain	that	CSR	is	an	
insincere	PR	measure	of	profit	maximization	whereby	companies	can	conduct	business	as	normal.	I	argue	
that	 CSR	 in	 the	 Myanmar	 petroleum	 industry	 is	 influenced	 by	 more	 complex	 factors	 than	 profit	
maximization	 or	 image	 management.	 CSR	 initiatives	 are	 sculpted	 by	 (1)	 the	 geography	 of	 petroleum	
extraction,	(2)	corporate	philosophies	and	company	national	origins,	and	(3)	type	of	company	operations.	
The	petroleum	industry’s	CSR	activities	to	date,	in	terms	of	geographic	span	and	development	targets,	all	fit	
into	a	 spectrum	of	 assumed	 spheres	of	 corporate	 responsibility	 that	have	been	 forged	by	 the	 corporate	
‘architects’	and	tempered	by	geographic	and	global	forces.	 	
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1.	Introducing	the	Boundaries	
Investigating	the	Myanmar	petroleum	industry	provides	a	dramatic	picture	of	the	underlying	
structures	involved	with	resource	extraction	and	its	corresponding	extreme	landscapes.	However,	
this	 topic	 also	 unveils	 an	 expanding	 social	 network	 of	 corporate-funded	 social	 initiatives,	 also	
known	 as	 Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	 (CSR)	 programs.	 This	 sector	 does	 not	 span	 across	 the	
country	 in	 a	 geographically	 uniform	 manner.	 Rather,	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 companies	 invest,	
extract,	 and	 transport	oil	 and	gas	 in	 select	 channels	out	of	Myanmar,	predominantly	 for	 foreign	
consumption.	 Onshore	 production	 sites	 are	 scattered	 throughout	 both	 remote	 and	 populated	
locales	across	 the	country.	 	 Offshore	pipelines,	 connecting	deep-water	blocks,	 can	cross	conflict	
zones	on	the	borderlands	and	are	said	to	exacerbate	tensions.	One	report	stated	that	much	of	the	
wealth	generated	by	this	industry	never	even	enters	Myanmar.	A	vast	majority	of	the	petroleum	is	
purely	intended	for	Thai	and	Chinese	consumption	(Arakan	Oil	Watch,	2012).	The	major	pipelines,	
the	 Yadana	 and	 Shwe	 pipelines,	 are	 marred	 by	 allegations	 of	 forced	 relocations,	 forced	 labor,	
torture,	inadequate	compensations,	and	unregulated	environmental	exploitation.	 	
Yet,	 there	 is	 a	 converse	 side	 to	 this	bleak	picture,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 social	 programs	 initiated	by	
these	 very	 same	 corporations.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 global	 trend	 towards	 the	 deregulation	 of	 state	
control	 over	 corporate	 ventures	 and	 the	 commodification	 of	 development,	 there	 is	 a	 push	 for	
corporate	social	 responsibility	 (CSR)	programs	 in	Myanmar	 to	answer	 for	unequal	distribution	of	
wealth	 as	well	 as	 the	 social	 and	 ecological	 injustices	 generated	 by	 corporations.	Many	 of	 these	
corporations	initiate	development	programs,	such	as	clinics,	orphanages,	and	tree-plantings.	In	the	
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absence	 of	 a	 strong	 NGO	 presence	 and	 an	 expansive	 state	 welfare	 network	 in	 the	 recent	 past	
(before	2014),	this	research	demonstrates	corporations	profoundly	shaped	the	social	landscape	of	
Myanmar	in	their	select	geographic	milieus.	CSR	can	be	disparaged	on	a	global	scale	as	an	empty	
moral	 endeavor,	 yet	 given	 Myanmar’s	 history,	 such	 projects	 are	 significant.	 These	 corporate	
actions	 should	not	be	dismissed,	but	 instead	 scrutinized	 so	as	 to	better	understand	 the	ways	 in	
which	companies	hold	themselves	accountable	legally,	socially,	and	environmentally.	 	 	
After	 decades	 of	 military	 rule	 and	 Western	 sanctions,	 in	 2011	 Myanmar	 embarked	 on	
ambitious	political	and	economic	reforms	by	transitioning	to	a	democratic	government,	liberalizing	
resource	and	private	sectors,	and	stimulating	foreign	investment	(World	Bank,	2014).	Previous	to	
this,	 companies	operating	 in	 country	were	publicly	 and	 frequently	 accused	of	 facilitating	human	
rights	 violations.	 After	 2011,	 international	 investment	 with	 the	 Union	 of	 Myanmar	 was	
enthusiastically	 encouraged.	 Leaders	 such	 as	 former	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Hillary	 Clinton	 declared,	
“Today	we	 say	 to	American	business:	 invest	 in	Burma	and	do	 it	 responsibly.”	Nobel	Peace	Prize	
Laureate,	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi,	 reversed	her	words,	and	now	acknowledges	that	Total	and	Chevron	
are	“responsible	 investors”	 (Nebehay).	The	CSR	programs	along	 the	Yadana	pipeline,	enacted	by	
Total,	 in	particular	are	now	cited	a	template	for	emulation.	 In	years	past,	these	same	companies	
were	vilified	for	engaging	the	very	same	investments	in	country,	by	the	same	actors.	 	
Myanmar’s	 government	 reciprocates	 by	 welcoming	 investors,	 but	 on	 the	 condition	 that	
companies	 conduct	 business	 in	 a	 socially	 and	 environmentally	 responsible	 manner	 (Lall,	 2012).	
Thus,	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR)	is	regarded	as	the	“key”	to	market	entry	in	Myanmar.	It	
is	the	“magic	words	on	everyone’s	lips,”	(Lall,	2012).	 	
In	 reference	 to	 the	 flood	 of	 incoming	 investments	 (across	 all	 sectors),	 Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi	
declared:	 	
“I	want	good,	hard-headed	businessmen	who	are	 intent	on	making	a	good	profit	 for	
themselves,	but	in	a	responsible	way	so	that	we	also	may	benefit	from	your	presence.	
That	means	that	when	you	talk	about	responsibility,	it's	not	just	CSR,	it's	not	just	social	
responsibility.	It's	political	responsibility,	legal	responsibility.	It's	responsibility	in	a	very	
broad	sense	of	the	word”	(Ra	&	Griffin,	2014).	
But	 what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 be	 responsible?	 Where	 exactly	 does	 this	 “broad	 sense”	 of	 the	
responsibly	occur,	and	how	is	it	created	and	sustained?	Which	players	in	an	industry	participate	in	
responsibility,	and	who	determines	what	 is	and	 is	not	 socially	 responsible?	What	 if	 there	are	no	
legal	standards?	And,	is	CSR	really	just	an	empty	PR	venture?	 	
Defining	the	boundaries	around	responsibility	has	 long	troubled	governments,	corporations,	
and	civil	society.	As	postulated	by	Ferguson	in	The	Structures	of	Responsibility,	a	defining	question	
of	our	 time	 is:	 “how	to	 identify	a	unit	of	 responsibility,	 in	a	 fiendishly	 complex,	multiply-layered	
and	decidedly	trans-national	apparatus	of	harm-production?”	(Ferguson,	2012).	 	
CSR	is	complex	because	it	does	not	have	a	concrete	definition,	and	is	further	complicated	by	
the	 intricate	economic	structure	of	companies,	contractors,	 subcontractors,	 shareholders,	etc.	 in	
any	 given	 economic	 project.	 Generally,	 CSR	 emerged	 as	 a	 self-regulating	 response	 by	 a	
corporation,	in	order	to	take	responsibility	for	its	impacts	on	societies	and	ecosystems	(e.g.	HSSE	
standards).	 CSR	 can	 be	 further	 used	 as	 a	 means	 to	 enact	 programs	 that	 aim	 to	 redistribute	
generated	profits	in	the	form	of	community	or	social	programs.	However	in	Myanmar,	critics	brush	
this	as	a	political	‘check	box’	without	follow	up,	execution,	legal	guidelines,	or	worse,	as	a	means	
for	money	laundering	(in	the	form	of	donations).	Globally	CSR	has	been	disregarded	as	an	empty	
PR	venture	that	ultimately	serves	to	maximize	the	corporate	image	(Haalboom,	2012).	
To	get	a	handle	around	what	it	means	to	be	“responsible,”	I	investigated	the	collective	way	in	
which	actors	in	the	petroleum	industry	in	Myanmar	enact	CSR	from	1990	to	2014.	The	oil	and	gas	
(O&G)	 industry	 is	 the	most	 lucrative,	 and	arguably	powerful,	 sector	 in	 the	 country.	 The	practice	
and	philosophy	of	CSR,	which	originated	in	this	industry,	is	proclaimed	to	be	the	starting	point	for	
this	newly	charted	course	of	 responsible	business	 in	Myanmar.	Yet,	activists	and	critics	maintain	
that	 CSR	 is	 an	 insincere	 PR	 measure	 of	 profit	 maximization	 whereby	 a	 company	 can	 conduct	
business	as	normal.	 	
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After	reviewing	the	activities	of	19	energy	companies	in	Myanmar	and	cross	referencing	with	
prominent	activists,	multilaterals,	NGOs,	academics,	and	specialists,	I	came	to	the	conclusion	that	
CSR	 in	 the	Myanmar	 oil	 and	 gas	 industry	 can	 provide	 an	 initial	 insight	 to	 the	 above	 questions	
regarding	the	meaning,	geography,	methods,	and	players	of	“responsibility.”	 I	 further	argue	that	
CSR	 in	 the	 Myanmar	 petroleum	 industry	 is	 influenced	 by	 more	 complex	 factors	 than	 profit	
maximization	 or	 image	 management.	 CSR	 initiatives	 are	 sculpted	 by	 (1)	 the	 geography	 of	
petroleum	 extraction,	 (2)	 corporate	 philosophies	 and	 company	 national	 origins,	 and	 (3)	 type	 of	
company	 operations.	 Details	 of	 CSR	 initiatives	 are	 shaped	 by	 individual	 corporate	 logics.	 The	
boundaries	around	these	corporate	spheres	of	responsibility	have	been	orchestrated	by	a	range	of	
actors,	institutions,	and	forces.	This	has	resulted	in	an	expansive	network	of	responsibility	in	terms	
of	 geographic	 coverage	 and	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 development	 targets.	 In	 short,	 CSR	 and	 the	
understanding	of	“responsibility”’	is	complex.	Theses	nuances	cannot	be	wholly	brushed	off	as	an	
empty-hearted	PR	measure.	 	
To	 support	 my	 arguments,	 I	 first	 provide	 some	 theoretical	 context	 for	 CSR	 and	 the	 social	
context	of	Myanmar’s	 industry.	 I	 then	provide	some	context	to	the	political	nature	of	petroleum	
and	 then	 to	 extreme	 operations.	 After	 this,	 I	 introduce	 the	 situation	 that	 is	 the	 nexus	 of	 CSR,	
Myanmar,	 and	Oil	&	Gas.	 Following	 this,	 I	 summarize	my	methods.	Next,	 I	 present	my	 research	
findings.	In	this	section	I	describe	the	three	primary	factors	that	shape	CSR	programs,	followed	by	
individualized	corporate	reasons.	First,	 I	 investigate	the	geographic	span	of	CSR	to	 illustrate	how	
the	 geography	 of	 an	 operation	 affects	 where	 CSR	 programs	 are	 created.	 I	 provide	 details	 and	
justifications	 for	 programs	 initiated	 by	 offshore	 and	 onshore	 operators.	 The	 boundaries	 around	
CSR	programs	are	also	constrained	by	company	budgets.	Next,	I	show	how	the	national	origins	and	
philosophy	 of	 a	 company	 can	 affect	 CSR	 implementation.	 And	 lastly,	 I	 explore	 the	 uneven	
obligations	of	CSR	imposed	upon	different	types	of	companies.	Generally,	upstream	operators	are	
expected	 to	 enact	 CSR,	 while	 the	 contractors,	 which	 are	 integral	 to	 any	 operation,	 are	 not	
expected	to	engage	in	CSR.	Although	there	are	specific	instances	which	defy	these	generalizations,	
this	paper	provides	an	insight	into	overall	logic	of	CSR	in	the	industry.	
	 Dissecting	 where	 and	 how	 companies	 enact	 CSR	 gives	 insight	 to	 the	 emerging	 shape	 of	
responsibility	 in	 this	 sector	 and	 country.	 Given	 the	 impact	 corporations	 have	 on	 our	 earth	 and	
society,	this	is	deserved	of	close	attention.	This,	in	turn,	provides	a	window	into	the	ways	in	which	
companies	 now	 demonstrate	 ‘social	 responsibility’	 in	 a	 post-colonial,	 capitalistic,	 global	
political-economic	framework.	
2.	Theoretical	Framework	 	
2.1	The	Context	of	CSR	 	
Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	 is	 a	 business	 initiative	where	 corporations	 strive	 to	mitigate	
environmental	and	social	 impacts	(Occupational	Health	and	Safety	standards,	etc.),	to	abide	by	a	
set	 of	 regulations	 and	 standards	 (using	 the	 Equator	 Principles	 or	 IFC	 standards),	 as	 well	 as	 to	
improve	the	public	sphere	(in	the	form	of	community	programs).	In	the	absence	of	a	global	 legal	
entity	to	hold	corporations	accountable	for	environmental	negligence,	humanitarian	abuses,	and	a	
deregulated	 economic	 legal	 framework	 which	 enables	 profit	 maximization	 at	 the	 cost	 of	
ecosystems	and	communities,	CSR	emerged	as	a	self-regulating	corporate	response	to	public	and	
stakeholder	demands	for	more	responsible	operations	and	actions.	 	
At	this	same	time,	progressive	critics	of	CSR	view	such	initiatives	as	“market	led	and	privatized	
forms	 of	 governance	 associated	 with	 neoliberal	 globalization”	 (Barkan,	 2013).	 It	 has	 been,	 and	
continues	 to	 be,	 cast	 off	 as	 both	 “disingenuous”	 and	 “ineffective”	 in	 global	 and	 local	 contexts	
(Haalboom,	 2012).	 All	 of	 these	 claims	 are	 broad	 postulations	 that	 ignore	 specific	 corporate	
activities	and	geographic	contexts	which	should	deserve	closer	attention.	 	
CSR	has	been	“undergoing	a	definitional	evolution”	since	the	1940s	and	has	crystallized	into	a	
form	 of	 self-regulated,	 voluntary	 investment	 standards	 in	 reaction	 to	 increased	 public	 concern	
about	successive	deregulations	in	the	1990s	(Shamir,	2010).	It	aims	to	placate	the	legal	and	moral	
problems	that	companies	encounter	when	investing	in	states	without	strict	regulations.	CSR	can	go	
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beyond	 internal	compliance:	 it	has	evolved	as	a	venue	for	redistributing	corporate	wealth	 in	 the	
form	of	welfare	(‘CSR	programs’).	 	
In	 spite	 of	 its	 imprecise	 definition,	 CSR	 is	 now	 promoted	 by	 societies,	 governments,	 and	
corporations.	Organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank,	United	Nations,	and	Organization	of	Economic	
Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD)	have	endorsed,	promoted,	and	systemized	CSR	programs	
(Lee,	 2008).	Most	 Fortune	500	 firms	now	actively	 promote	CSR	 in	 their	 annual	 reports,	 and	 the	
Conference	Board	reported	that	90%	of	corporate	managers	state	that	their	companies	take	CSR	
“very	 seriously”	 (Lee,	 2008).	 The	 CSR	 initiative	 has	 become	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 businesses,	 both	
from	an	economic	and	social	standpoint.	However,	the	financial	benefits	for	the	company	and	its	
shareholders	remain	inconclusive	and	it	still	is	not	clearly	defined	(Lee,	2008).	 	
This	 broad	 understanding	 leaves	 “CSR”	 very	 difficult	 to	 recognize.	 As	 a	 framework,	 I	
conceptualize	CSR	as	a	practice	that	comes	about	in	two	distinct	forms:	 	
• First, CSR	addresses	the	lack	of	government	regulations	upon	corporate	activities.	It	can	be	an	
internal	governance	practice	that	aims	to	ensure	company	operations	adhere	to	environmental	
standards,	pay	taxes,	abide	by	international	regulations,	and	protect	human	and	labour	rights.	
The	 internal	aspects	of	CSR	can	be	understood	as	strong	Human	Resources	and	HSSE	policies	
and	robust	codes	of	conduct	so	that	companies	can	still	perform	to	an	international	standard,	
even	in	a	deregulated	or	unregulated	legal	context.	This	can	also	include	(and	should)	grievance	
mechanisms,	as	this	is	an	integral	part	to	a	company	ensuring	its	social	license	to	operate.	 	
• Second,	 CSR	 can	 aim	 to	 redistribute	 the	 generated	 wealth	 in	 the	 form	 of	 corporate	
philanthropy.	 This	 is	 the	external	 community	 form	of	 CSR	which	 is	manifested	 in	 community	
initiatives	and	social	programs.	These	programs	are	not	part	of	the	company’s	core	extractive	
operations	and,	at	 times,	can	appear	 to	be	 irrelevant	 to	a	company’s	philosophy.	Confusingly	
enough,	sometimes	these	community	initiatives	can	be	any	combination	of	social	programs	in	
areas	of	company	operations	and/or	social	programs	with	no	geographic	or	company	link.	
The	external	 community	aspect	of	CSR	 incurs	divergent	positions.	Some	maintain	 it	 is	not	a	
company’s	responsibility	to	drive	social	change	(as	this	is	an	impingement	on	the	state’s	duty),	and	
the	 company	 should	 instead	 focus	 on	 paying	 taxes,	 abiding	 by	 environmental	 standards,	 and	
instituting	 community	 grievance	 mechanisms	 only.	 Some	 claim	 that	 because	 ‘failed	 states’	 are	
unable	 to	 sufficiently	 collect	 taxes	 in	 order	 to	 institute	 welfare	 programs,	 companies	 have	 an	
obligation	(and	responsibility)	to	fill	the	void	and	enact	community	projects.	 	 	
Most	studies	to	date	overemphasize	the	business	side	of	CSR	rather	than	provide	evidence	of	
social	 changes.	 Corporations	 are	 indispensable	 members	 of	 our	 society;	 both	 society	 and	
corporations	 are	 have	 profound	 behavioral	 influences	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 her	 study	 of	 the	mining	
company	Anglo	America,	Rajak	claims	that	anthropologists	study	CSR	by	looking	at	the	“intended	
targets,	 rather	 than	 the	 architects,	 of	 these	 ethical	 regimes”	 (Rajak,	 2011).	 The	 media,	 NGO	
reports,	and	academic	accounts	usually	focus	on	the	beneficiaries	of	CSR	rather	than	the	architects	
of	the	CSR	industry.	 	
This	account	provides	an	overview	to	the	complex,	but	systematic,	logic	behind	the	“units	of	
responsibility”	as	justified	by	the	CSR	“architects”	of	the	Myanmar	petroleum	sector.	Given	that	it	
is	 difficult	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 a	 company’s	 tax	 record,	 application	 of	 environmental	 standards,	
guarantee	of	 labour	protection,	and	other	 internal	CSR	components,	 this	account	focuses	on	the	
external	 CSR	 programs	 and	 grievance	 mechanisms	 orchestrated	 by	 the	 architects	 in	 this	
deregulated,	frontier	sector.	 	
2.2.	Oil	&	Society	in	Myanmar	
During	the	1980’s	Western	divestment	 in	Myanmar,	 it	became	an	ethical	obligation	to	shun	
investment	 as	 an	 effort	 to	 encourage	 respect	 for	 human	 rights.	 The	 impact	 of	 these	 sanctions,	
although	 severe,	 was	 tempered	 by	 reinforced	 investment	 by	 Asian	 companies	 -	 especially	 in	
extractive	sectors	 (O&G	and	mining	 in	particular).	Corporations	 that	 remained	 in	Myanmar	have	
been	 accused	 of	 serious	 malpractices	 including	 reckless	 ecological	 destruction,	 the	 blatant	
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disregard	for	human	rights,	as	well	as	 the	enablement	of	 the	Myanmar	army.	Western	oil	giants	
Total	and	Chevron	remained	at	this	time.	 	
There	 is	 a	 centralized	 component	 to	 the	 energy	 sector.	 To	 invest,	 every	 foreign	 and	 local	
company	must	 sign	 contracts1	 with	 the	 state-run	Myanmar	Oil	 and	Gas	 Enterprise	 (MOGE)	 and	
afterwards	may	explore	and	extract	petroleum.	Myanmar	is	emerging	as	a	key	producer	of	natural	
gas,	with	more	than	60	global	O&G	companies	participating	in	exploration	(Oxford	Business	Group,	
2014).	 Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 government	 auctioned	 onshore	 and	 offshore	 blocks	 for	
companies	to	explore	for	petroleum.	The	entire	continental	shelf,	as	well	as	vast	regions	on	land,	
were	sold	to	the	highest	bidders	in	blind	auctions.	 	
The	Myanmar	economy	is	“one	of	the	least	developed	in	the	world;”	it	suffers	from	decades	
of	stagnation,	mismanagement,	and	isolation	(Myanmar	Profile,	2014).	Transparency	International	
in	2010	ranked	Myanmar	as	the	second	most	corrupt	state	in	the	world	(just	beating	out	Somalia	
as	dead	 last).	 	 However	 in	2014,	Myanmar	moved	up	eighteen	 slots	 to	 share	 the	156th	position	
with	 Cambodia	 out	 of	 175	 ranked	 countries	 (Transparency	 International,	 2014).	 Compared	with	
other	 Southeast	 Asian	 neighbors,	Myanmar	 lagged	 far	 behind	 in	 terms	 of	 companies’	 ability	 to	
secure	electricity,	permits,	 licenses,	and	 the	average	 times	 to	set	up	businesses	 (Temphairojana,	
2013).	 	
Although	accurate	statistics	are	difficult	at	best	to	come	by,	Myanmar	has	consistently	ranked	
at	 the	 bottom	 of	 most	 socio-economic	 indicators.	 In	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 revenue	 statistics	
generated	from	the	petroleum	industry,	Myanmar	is	one	of	the	poorest	countries	in	East	Asia	and	
the	Pacific.	 The	estimated	GDP	per	 capita	 for	2012/2013	 is	$868.	Thirty-two	percent	of	 children	
under	 the	 age	 of	 five	 suffer	 from	malnutrition,	 and	 access	 to	 drinking	water	 is	 limited	 in	many	
regions.	 Current	power	 infrastructures	only	meet	half	 of	 the	 current	demand.2	 Only	 30%	of	 the	
population	 is	connected	to	the	grid,	yet	25%	of	Thailand’s	electricity	comes	from	Myanmar	(U.S.	
Campaign	for	Burma,	2012).The	consumption	of	electricity	in	Myanmar	is	one	of	the	lowest	in	the	
world:	20	times	less	than	the	global	average	(World	Bank,	2014).	 	
Myanmar’s	 GDP	 expanded	 8.7%	 in	 2014	 from	 the	 previous	 year;	 this	 trend	 is	 expected	 to	
continue	 (Global	 Finance,	 2015).	 The	 O&G	 sector	 has	 been	 the	 single	 largest	 source	 of	 foreign	
exchange	in	Myanmar	for	decades.	Foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	in	the	O&G	sector	amounted	to	
$15.18	billion	as	of	October	2014.	This	accounts	 for	over	30%	of	 the	total	FDI	 (the	power	sector	
comes	in	at	a	close	second)	(Aye	Myat,	2015).	The	sale	of	natural	gas	alone	was	expected	to	bring	
an	estimated	$29	billion	over	the	next	thirty	years.	 	
2.3.	The	Political	Nature	of	Petroleum3 
Petroleum	 extraction	 is	 a	 highly	 controversial	 industry.	 Companies	 have	 engaged	 in	
unscrupulous	 business	 practices	 resulting	 in	 severe	 social	 and	 environmental	 costs.	 High	 profile	
disasters,	from	oil	spills	to	human	rights	abuses,	fuel	public	outcry	and	enact	harsh	criticism	from	
the	 media,	 NGOs,	 and	 government.	 Such	 initiatives	 have	 resulted	 in	 significant	 and	 positive	
changes	 in	 business	 practices.	 In	 reaction,	 oil	majors	 have	 instituted	 strict	 safety	measures	 and	
turned	to	CSR	as	a	means	to	counter	the	negative	public	sentiments,	build	reputational	capital,	and	
ultimately	achieve	legitimacy	(Du	&	Vieira,	2012).	Currently	oil	majors	spend	hundreds	of	millions	
of	dollars	in	an	effort	to	improve	their	safety	record,	reduce	emissions,	and	to	alter	the	perception	
of	 their	 unsustainable	 practices	 (Bridge	 &	 Le	 Billon,	 2013).	 However,	 CSR	 in	 this	 industry	 most	
especially	has	been	criticized	as	a	façade	which	allows	oil	corporations	to	continue	with	business	as	
usual	 (Godfrey,	2009).	Bridge	and	Le	Billion	note	that	CSR	cannot	address	the	broader	economic	
and	governance	issues	which	are	associated	with	corporate	injustices.																																																									
1	 Public	Sharing	Contracts,	PSC	
2	 As	 a	 recent	 Mizzima	 article	 details,	 the	 government	 has	 promised	 access	 to	 electricity	 for	 50%	 of	 the	
population	 by	 2020.	 Historically,	 most	 electricity	 has	 been	 siphoned	 to	 the	 major	 cities	 rather	 than	
distributed	across	rural	regions	(Mizzima	News).	
3	 Terms	 such	 as	 ‘Big	 Oil’	 and	 ‘Oil	 majors’	 are	 used	 to	 group	 the	 world’s	 largest	 publically	 owned	 oil	
corporations;	Total	and	Chevron	are	amongst	the	six	largest,	and	are	also	known	as	‘supermajors.’	
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The	 geologic	 and	 geographic	 properties	 of	 petroleum	 make	 it	 a	 deeply	 political	 resource	
(Mitchell,	2013).	The	fossil	fuel	network	with	its	corridors	and	venues	of	investment	are	marked	by	
a	 concentration	 of	 wealth	 and	 power.	 Petroleum	 is	 not	 distributed	 evenly	 around	 the	 world	
because	the	necessary	geologic	conditions	are	not	uniform.	Extraction	and	processing	requires	a	
much	smaller	work	force	(as	compared	to	our	previous	major	global	fuel	source,	coal).	Further,	the	
liquid	 form	 of	 petroleum	 allows	 for	 pipeline	 transportation	 as	 opposed	 to	 railway	 transport	
manually	loaded	into	carts.	Such	physical	properties	have	diminished	the	power	of	local	workers,	
who	normally	would	control	the	sites	of	the	energy	production	(Mitchell,	2013).	 	
In	Fuelling	War,	LeBillion	examines	the	paradox	of	resource	rich	states	plagued	by	conflict	and	
poverty.	 Significant	 portions	 of	 resource	 rich	 countries	 are	 subject	 to	 poverty,	 harsh	 conditions,	
and	blatant	 inequality.	Strategic	resources,	such	as	oil,	attract	foreign	investors;	yet,	the	physical	
properties	of	oil	combined	with	the	preexisting	social	and	political	structures	do	not	distribute	the	
generated	 wealth	 in	 an	 equal	 manner.	With	 increasing	 demand	 for	 petroleum	 the	 ‘frontier’	 of	
extraction	has	shifted	to	the	extreme.	This	shift	occurs	both	in	a	physical	sense,	such	as	Arctic	and	
ultra-deep	water	exploration,	and	 in	a	social	sense,	such	as	 investing	 in	states	with	controversial	
governance	systems	like	the	D.R.	Congo	and	Equatorial	Guinea.	The	social	nature	of	this	political	
resource	is	augmented	in	such	unconventional	contexts	(Bridge	&	Le	Billon,	2013).	Myanmar	can	
be	 considered	 an	 extreme	 context	 as	 it	 is	 the	 world’s	 newest	 frontier	 for	 investment,	 it	 is	
undergoing	 rapid	 political	 and	 social	 transformations,	 and	 there	 are	 minimal	 regulations	 for	
ongoing	accelerating	extraction.	
2.4.	Extreme	Operations,	Petroleum,	&	Responsibility	
CSR,	as	a	business	practice	and	concept,	has	been	globally	accepted	by	mining	and	petroleum	
corporations.	These	industries	in	particular	can	be	notorious	for	environmental	negligence	(Arakan	
Oil	 Watch,	 2012)	 (Doe	 v.	 Unocal	 Case	 History,	 2012)	 (Mitchell,	 2013).	 Extraction	 can	 occur	 in	
“extreme	contexts”	 such	as	unstable	and	militarized	governments	 (Dellinger,	2009)	or	 in	 socially	
violent	environments	(Peluso	&	Watts,	2001).	 	
Commonly,	these	regions	have	little	regulatory	oversight	over	private	investments,	and	they	
lack	 robust	 state	welfare	 systems	 for	 local	 citizens.	 The	 generated	wealth	 is	 channeled	 into	 the	
hands	of	a	few	(Bridge	&	Le	Billon,	2013).	In	such	instances,	companies	are	criticized	for	engaging	
in	such	a	socially	violent	 landscape	and	for	capitalizing	on	the	absence	of	 regulations.	States	are	
criticized	for	not	redistributing	the	generated	resource	wealth	to	its	citizens.	 	
There	 are	 methods	 to	 hold	 companies	 accountable	 in	 unregulated	 legal	 contexts,	 and	
Myanmar	boasts	a	pivotal	 legal	example.	In	the	1990’s,	pressure	from	EarthRights	International’s	
legal	 front	 accumulated	 in	 the	 court	 case	 Doe	 v.	 Unocal,	 where	 Myanmar	 farmers	 sued	 the	
multinational	corporation	Unocal	(now	acquired	by	Chevron)	for	the	violations	of	human	rights	in	
the	construction	of	the	Yadana	pipeline	(Shamir,	2010).	This	set	the	precedent	for	plaintiffs	to	use	
the	Alien	Tort	Claims	Act4	 as	a	way	to	enforce	the	respect	for	human	rights	through	the	American	
federal	court	system.	 	 	
Operating	 and	 investing	 in	 such	 compromising	 situations	 is	 highly	 controversial.	 CSR,	 in	 the	
form	 of	 corporate	 voluntary	 self-governance	 and	 corporate	 funded	 welfare	 programs,	 aims	 to	
remedy	 these	 criticisms.	 Accordingly,	 investments	 in	 “extreme	 contexts”	 or	 “failed	 states”	 in	
particular	 demonstrate	 a	 clear	 need	 for	 (1)	 corporate	 self-regulation	 and	 (2)	 a	 form	 of	 wealth	
distribution	 for	 social	 programs.	 Given	 the	 vague	 or	 absence	 of	 government	 oversight	 and	
inadequate	 welfare	 programs,	 it	 is	 now	 expected	 that	 companies	 both	 (1)	 “self-regulate”	 and	
(2)“give	back.”	Thus	CSR	has	become	an	integral	facet	to	private	sector	engagement	with	resource																																																									
4	 The	Alien	Tort	Claims	Act	(also	known	as	the	Alien	Tort	Statute)	is	a	section	in	the	U.S.	Code	which	ensures,	
“the	district	courts	shall	have	original	jurisdiction	of	any	civil	action	by	an	alien	for	a	tort	only,	committed	in	
violation	of	the	law	of	nations	or	a	treaty	of	the	United	States.”	U.S.	law	has	interpreted	this	Act	as	a	means	
for	 foreign	 citizens	 to	 seek	 justice	 in	 U.S.	 courts	 for	 human	 rights	 violations	 committed	 outside	 the	
boundaries	of	the	U.S.		
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extraction	 in	 such	 contexts,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 cases	 from	 Rio	 Tinto 5 	 in	 Bougainville,	 PNG	
(Gilberthorpe	&	Banks,	2012)	to	Newmont	in	Indonesia	(Welker,	2014).	
While	CSR	is	strongly	encouraged	in	Myanmar	for	all	incoming	companies,	there	is	no	official	
definition	of	CSR	 from	the	central	government.	The	Myanmar	 Investment	Commission	 (MIC)	has	
no	specific	guidelines,	and	 there	 is	no	 legal	 structure	 to	enact	CSR6.	Companies	 interpret	CSR	as	
anything	from	charitable	donations	to	robust	health	and	safety	(HSE)	procedures.	 	
Such	 indirection	 is	 not	 uncommon.	 Globally,	 there	 is	 no	 sovereign	 body	 to	 govern	 the	
development	 of	 CSR,	 and	 the	 conditions	 outlined	 by	 the	United	Nations	 are	 ambiguous.	 A	U.N.	
Brief	acknowledged	that	a	detailed	definition	remains	a	“vexed	issue.”	At	the	very	least,	CSR	means	
a	business	must	abide	by	local	legal	obligations	and	that	they	“do	no	harm.”	At	best,	investments	
will	support	“societal	goals”	and	“sustainable	development.”	In	short,	CSR	is	up	for	interpretation.	 	
In	an	interview	with	a	director	of	an	O&G	services	company,	he	exclaimed	“it’s	like	the	Wild	West	
of	 CSR!”	 thus	 indicating	 the	 panoply	 of	 “responsible”	 corporate	 actions,	 understandings,	 and	
enactments.	 	
2.5.	CSR	in	Myanmar’s	Oil	&	Gas	Industry:	‘the	Wild	West	of	CSR’	
Myanmar’s	 first	CSR	programs	were	 initiated	 in	 the	1990’s	by	Total,	 a	 French	multinational	
petroleum	 corporation	which	 operates	 the	 Yadana	 Project.	While	 these	 flagship	 programs	were	
created,	 Total	 and	 Unocal	 (now	 Chevron)	 were	 brought	 to	 court	 in	 Belgium	 and	 the	 US,	
respectively,	 for	 facilitating	 the	 violent	 practices	 of	 the	 Myanmar	 army	 while	 constructing	 the	
pipelines.	These	socio-economic	projects	now	support	50,000	people	across	25	villages.	 	
Since	 then,	 CSR	 initiatives	 by	 international	 and	 domestic	 oil	 companies	 have	 proliferated.	
Many	are	now	found	in	locales	that	are	both	proximate	and	distant	to	company	operations.	They	
range	from	addressing	a	tale	of	hardship	to	putting	a	city	on	the	electrical	grid.	Levels	of	corporate	
commitment	and	extent	vary;	others	are	largely	uncoordinated,	even	among	partners.	Many	could	
be	confused	with	an	aid	project	initiated	by	NGOs,	missionaries,	multilateral	institutions,	and	the	
like.	A	number	of	CSR	programs	appear	 to	be	philanthropic	acts	with	 little	business	 rationale	or	
geographic	relationship.	Many	projects	have	been	confused	with	aspects	of	Buddhist	merit-making	
or	 as	 a	 donation.	 Environmental	 groups	 criticize	 oil-funded	 social	 programs	 as	 ‘Boutique	 CSR’	
which	ultimately	serves	a	company’s	image	or	profit	maximization.	Studies	on	CSR,	Myanmar,	and	
Oil	&	Gas	include	research	conducted	by	Holliday	and	Black,	
Many	CSR	programs	focus	on	education,	health	care,	and	the	environment.	They	are	found	in	
regions	 far	 from	petroleum	operations,	while	others	are	 in	close	proximity	 to	offshore	pipelines.	
Examples	 include	 scholarship	 opportunities,	 tree	 plantings,	 funding	 for	 festivals,	 and	 medical	
clinics.	Although	there	are	multiple	partners	and	contractors	 for	any	given	operation,	only	select	
companies	 partake	 in	 CSR.	Many	 programs	 are	 not	 detailed	 on	 company	websites,	 while	 other	
companies	overemphasize	some	of	their	CSR	activities,	according	to	research	analysts.	
Select	 companies	 have	 a	 particular	 focus	 for	 their	 development	 programs.	 For	 example,	
Parami	focuses	on	monastic	education;	General	Electric	works	on	legal	reform,	energy	access,	and	
maternal	 health;	 operators	 from	 Daewoo	 to	 Petronas	 will	 provide	 emergency	 relief	 and	 enact	
expansive	networks;	while	other	companies	argue	that	 it	 is	not	the	company’s	place	to	subsidize	
aid	programs.	Some	companies,	such	as	Total,	CNPC,	and	Petronas	have	initiated	programs	across	
the	 country	 in	 addition	 to	projects	 in	 their	 area	 of	 operations.	 There	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 an	
immediate	rationale	to	explain	the	geographic	diversity	and	variety	of	development	targets.	One																																																									
5	 Rio	Tinto	extracted	copper	and	gold	from	the	island	of	Bougainville,	PNG.	Extreme	social	tensions	arose	at	
the	 Panguan	 mine	 from	 environmental	 degradation,	 which	 culminated	 in	 militant	 riots,	 PNG	 troop	
deployment,	and	 later	a	civil	war	(the	 ‘Coconut	Revolution’).	There	 is	recent	talk	of	welcoming	the	copper	
mine	back	to	Panguan	on	the	condition	that	the	company	implements	a	thorough	CSR	initiative.	 	 	
6	 Companies	 in	 Myanmar	 will	 pursue	 a	 Social	 License	 to	 Operate	 (SLO),	 but	 may	 shy	 away	 from	 an	
internationally	accepted	CSR	program,	as	such	goes	beyond	its	legal	requirements	Invalid	source	specified..	
A	SLO	is	not	a	legally	binding	agreement,	but	it	can	be	built	upon	through	community	acceptance.	
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gains	a	greater	appreciation	of	the	scale	of	petroleum	investments	(and	developments)	in	the	face	
of	such	an	astounding	display	of	programs.	
Weaving	 together	 the	 “units	 of	 responsibility”	 as	 understood	 by	 the	 architects	 of	 the	
Myanmar	 petroleum	 industry	 provide	 unexpected	 results 7 .	 CSR	 aims	 to	 placate	 social	 and	
ecological	ills	generated	by	the	industry.	However,	in	the	absence	of	specific	laws	and	in	the	face	of	
conflicting	expectations	from	local	and	international	actors,	petroleum	corporations	have	assumed	
(1)	 distinct	 geographic	 spheres	 and	 (2)	 particular	 arenas	 of	 development	 to	 exhibit	 their	
responsibility.	At	first	glance,	the	network	of	CSR	cases	does	not	appear	to	have	a	systemized	logic.	 	
3.	Methodology	&	Fieldwork	Overview	 	
I	 spent	 three	 months	 during	 the	 summer	 of	 2014	 in	 Myanmar	 and	 Thailand	 conducting	
fieldwork	for	this	project.	The	primary	field	site	was	Yangon,	Myanmar.	It	is	the	economic	capital	
and	the	office	location	for	petroleum	companies	and	for	organizations	that	monitor	and	conduct	
research	on	extractive	industries.	I	made	a	trip	to	Chiang	Mai,	Thailand	to	interview	environmental	
NGOs	whose	offices	are	not	yet	welcome	in	Myanmar.	In	total,	 I	conducted	26	formal	interviews	
and	three	informal	interviews.	 	
To	 conduct	 a	 sector	 wide	 survey,	 this	 analysis	 evaluates	 the	 CSR	 activity	 of	 19	 energy	
companies	 (15	 of	 which	 I	 interviewed).	 This	 includes:	 onshore	 operators	 and	 partners	 such	 as	
MOGE8,	MPRL9,	CJSC	Nobel	Oil10,	GoldPetrol11,	and	Parami	Energy	Group12;	offshore	operators	and	
partners	 such	 as	 Petronas13,	 Daewoo14,	 CNPC15,	 Chinnery	 Assets16,	 Total17,	 Chevron18,	 PTTEP19,	
CNOOC20	 and	 KT	 Energy21;	 and	 oilfield	 service	 companies	 such	 as	 Halliburton22,	 Weatherford23,																																																									7	 To	date,	there	have	only	been	a	few	published	accounts	of	CSR	in	association	with	Myanmar	petroleum	
industry	in	the	social	sciences.	Both	have	focused	on	Total’s	Yadana	Pipeline	(Black,	2009)	(Holliday,	2005).	
8	 A	state-owned	company,	MOGE	is	responsible	for	the	exploration,	development	and	gas	transit	as	well	as	
the	 onshore,	 shallow	 water	 and	 deep	 water	 block	 terms.	 The	 Myanma	 Petrochemical	 Enterprise	 (MPE)	
controls	the	processing	of	petroleum	and	the	Myanma	Petroleum	Products	Enterprise	(MPPE)	deals	with	the	
distribution	and	sales	of	petroleum	products.	
9	 A	privately	owned	company,	registered	in	the	British	Virgin	Islands	with	its	regional	head	office	located	in	
Singapore	but	run	by	Myanmar	nationals.	
10	 An	 independent	oil	and	gas	holding	company	from	Russia	that	 is	50%	foreign	owned	(China	 Investment	
Corporation	has	a	45%	stake).	
11	 A	foreign	joint	venture	and	is	majority	owned	by	Singaporean	conglomerate	Interra	
12	 Myanmar	group	of	companies	which	provides	offshore	and	onshore	oil	and	gas	field-services,	founded	in	
2004	
13	 Malaysian	government	owned	corporation,	subsidiary	of	Petroliam	Nasional	Berhad	(Petronas).	
14	 South	 Korea’s	 largest	 trading	 company,	 founded	 in	 1967.	 It	 is	 involved	 in	 steel,	 chemicals,	 metal,	
machinery,	and	resource	development	in	foreign	countries	
15	 China	National	Petroleum	Corporation:	Chinese	state-owned	oil	and	gas	corporations.	Largest	integrated	
energy	company	in	China.	
16	 Chinnery	Assets	Limited	operates	as	a	subsidiary	of	CNPC	Hong	Kong	Ltd.	A	joint	venture	formed	by	two	
subsidiaries	of	CNPC,	making	this	a	state-controlled	company.	
17	 A	 French	 multi-national	 integrated	 oil	 and	 gas	 company,	 Total	 S.	 A.	 is	 one	 of	 the	 six	 ‘supermajor’	 oil	
companies	in	the	world.	It	operates	in	upstream,	midstream,	and	downstream	oil	and	gas	and	is	a	large	scale	
chemical	manufacturer.	It	was	founded	in	1924.	
18	 Chevron	Corporation	is	a	multinational	(American)	energy	corporation,	engaged	in	upstream,	midstream,	
and	downstream.	One	of	the	world's	largest	companies.	Acquired	Unocal	after	the	Doe	v.	Unocal	court	case.	 	
19	 PTT	Public	Company,	Thai	state-owned	oil	and	gas	company.	
20	 China	National	Offshore	Oil	Company:	National	oil	company	from	China	
21	 Private,	family	owned	operations	in	Myanmar.	KT	Energy	focuses	on	the	oil	and	gas	industry	within	the	KT	
Group	
22	 American	multinational	corporation,	one	of	the	largest	oilfield	service	companies.	
23	 One	of	the	largest	oilfield	service	companies,	founded	in	Texas	in	1941.	
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Schlumberger24,	 Punj	 Lloyd25,	 and	 SMART	 Technical	 Services26.	 I	 include	 General	 Electric	 in	 my	
analysis	because	this	power	company	spearheads	CSR	initiatives.	 	
The	 petroleum	 industry	 is	 expansive	 and	 intricate;	 by	 no	means	 is	 one	 company	 the	main	
driver	of	 any	one	operation.	By	 asking	 corporations	where	 their	 responsibilities	 lie,	 I	 attempt	 to	
elucidate	the	rationales	behind	these	purveyors	of	CSR.	
I	 compared	 the	 corporate	 information	 with	 interviews	 and	 documents	 from	 related	
researchers,	monitoring	agencies,	and	 journalists.	 I	 interviewed	personnel	 from	the	World	Bank,	
Extractive	Industry	Transparency	Initiative27,	the	Asia	Development	Bank,	the	Centre	for	Business	
and	 Human	 Rights,	 the	 non-profit	 Spectrum28,	 Revenue	 Watch,	 the	 first	 American	 law	 firm	 in	
Myanmar	(HRH&M),	Global	Witness,	and	the	Myanmar	Center	for	Responsible	Business	(MCRB).	 	
I	 interviewed	 staff	 and/or	 program	 managers	 from	 several	 activist	 groups:	 EarthRights	
International	 (ERI),	 Arakan	 Oil	 Watch	 (AOW),	 and	 the	 Shwe	 Gas	 Movement	 (SGM).	 These	
interviews	provided	 some	 illuminating	accounts	of	petroleum	extraction	 that	are	not	 told	 in	 the	
CSR	 pamphlets	 or	 company	 websites.	 Furthermore,	 I	 conducted	 informal	 interviews	 with	 three	
professors	who	specialize	in	Myanmar	affairs.	 	 	
These	 interviews	 were	 necessary	 to	 better	 assess	 the	 contradictions	 and	 paradoxes	
discovered	 in	 my	 research	 topic.	 Although	 my	 interviews	 were	 open	 ended,	 I	 asked	 my	 O&G	
participants	to	elaborate	on:	
(1)	who	conducted	research	for	the	company’s	CSR	programs,	 	
(2)	where	are	the	CSR	programs,	 	
(3)	how	are	these	programs	received.	
I	asked	all	of	my	participants	to	describe:	
(4)	what	is	the	difference	between	a	community	CSR	program	and	a	similar	type	of	program	
funded	and	implemented	by	an	NGO,	aid	organization,	or	the	state,	and	 	
(5)	 the	 limitations	 of	 CSR,	 how	 it	 could	 be	 improved,	 and	 how	 corporate	 accountability	 is	
shaping	up	in	Myanmar.	 	
I	 readily	volunteered	anonymity	 for	 those	who	participated	 in	my	research	project,	and	this	
played	a	pivotal	role	in	being	granted	access.	Many	participants	did	not	want	to	be	quoted	directly,	
although	a	few	were	happy	to	be	cited.	To	be	consistent,	I	do	not	identify	any	individuals	by	name	
for	 either	 direct	 quotes	 or	 general	 insights.	 Instead	 I	 describe	my	 sources	 as	 “a	 CSR	manager,”	
“project	manager	 of	 an	NGO,”	 “oilfield	 service	 director,”	 and	 the	 like.	 	 Instead	 of	 using	 quotes	
with	 compromising	 information,	 I	 used	 confidential	 material	 as	 a	 frame	 of	 reference	 to	 better	
understand	the	ways	in	which	CSR	has	materialized.	 	
4.	Research	Findings:	The	Logic	of	the	Architects	 	 	
From	my	interviews	and	research	on	the	CSR	case	studies,	I	came	to	the	understanding	that	
there	 are	 three	 primary	 factors	 that	 drive	 how,	 what	 kind	 of,	 and	 where	 CSR	 programs	 are	
implemented.	First,	the	geographic	 location	of	company	operations	determines	where	many	CSR	
programs	 are	 initiated.	 Offshore	 operators,	 onshore	 operators,	 and	 contractors	 have	 select	
geographic	spheres	of	operations	and	thus	rationalized	corresponding	zones	of	CSR.	Second,	 the	
national	origins	and	individual	corporate	philosophies	can	determine	the	type	of	CSR	activity.	And	
third,	 the	 type	 of	 company	 operation	 (such	 as	 the	 operator	 vs.	 the	 contractor	 for	 an	 offshore	
pipeline)	has	a	clear	impact	on	CSR	initiatives.	 	 	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 three	 main	 factors,	 specific	 enactments	 of	 CSR	 are	 supported	 by	 an	
assortment	of	corporate	logics.	Some	companies	adhere	to	a	specific	corporate	philosophy	that	is																																																									
24	 The	world's	 largest	oilfield	service	company.	Founded	 in	1926	by	French	brothers,	headquarters	now	 in	
Houston	TX.	Publicly-listed	company.	
25	 Construction	and	engineering	service	group	for	energy	operations,	based	in	New	Delhi.	
26	 Oil	and	Gas	service	provider	to	foreign	and	local	customers	in	Myanmar,	founded	in	1994.	
27	 EITI	 is	 a	 global	 coalition	 of	 governments,	 companies,	 and	 civil	 society	 working	 together	 to	 improve	
openness	and	accountable	management	of	revenues	from	natural	resources	(EITI,	2014).	
28	 a	nonprofit	dedicated	to	the	Sustainable	Development	Knowledge	network	
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reflected	 in	their	campaigns	around	the	world.	Others	have	a	“business	case”	for	CSR,	some	CSR	
programs	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 an	 individual	 within	 a	 company,	 and	 other	
companies	respond	to	community	requests.	These	 logics,	combined	with	the	three	main	drivers,	
are	the	impetus	for	CSR	programs.	 	
4.1.	The	Geographic	Span	of	CSR	 	
Although	 petroleum	 is	 a	 national	 resource	 owned	 by	 states,	 as	 the	 resource	 is	 literally	
embedded	 in	 a	 state’s	 territory,	 there	 is	 a	 complex	 diversity	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 industry.	
Petroleum	is	understood	to	be	part	of	the	‘body’	of	the	state,	thus	evoking	charged	policy	decisions	
(Bridge	&	Le	Billon,	2013).	Yet	 it	 is	companies,	not	states,	which	explore,	transport,	and	produce	
petroleum.	 There	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 state	 owned	 (national)	 oil	 companies	 (NOCs)	 and	
international	oil	companies	 (IOCs).	Companies	are	 further	divided	 into	upstream	(exploration	for	
petroleum),	midstream	(transportation	of	the	oil	and	gas),	and	downstream	(the	refining	process).	
Contractors	 and	 sub-contractors	 provide	 drilling	 services,	 technical	 support,	 catering,	 security	
details,	 etc.,	 so	 that	 operations	 are	 even	 possible.	 As	 this	 resource	 is	 only	 found	 in	 certain	
environments,	it	requires	extensive	infrastructure	to	be	extracted	out	from	the	‘body’	of	the	state.	
This	 involves	 coordination	 from	 operators,	 partners,	 contractors,	 and	 sub-contractors.	 Oilfield	
service	companies,	such	as	Halliburton	and	Schlumberger,	are	essential	as	they	are	contracted	out	
for	 all	 projects.	 Even	 though	 there	 are	 dozens	 of	 corporations	 involved	 in	 any	 one	 project,	my	
research	indicates	that	most	CSR	initiatives	are	shouldered	by	the	upstream	operating	companies.	 	
4.1.1.	Offshore	Operators	 	
All	 offshore	 operators	must	 create	 CSR	 programs	 in	 geographic	 proximity	 to	 their	 zones	 of	
operations,	per	agreements	in	their	public	sharing	contract	(PSC)	with	MOGE.	Given	that	offshore	
extraction	occurs	miles	at	sea	with	no	communities	to	speak	of,	project	operators	must	perform	
CSR	 on	 land.	 This	 has	 come	 to	 mean	 that	 operators	 (such	 as	 Total,	 Daewoo,	 etc.29)	 create	
development	programs	in	the	vicinity	of	their	oil	terminal	and/or	pipeline	(Yadana,	Yetagun,	Shwe	
pipelines	 respectively).	 This	 expectation	 has	 encouraged	 CSR	 programs	 that	 are	 proximate	 to	
petroleum	operations.	 I	 regard	 this	as	a	direct	geographic	 rationale	 for	community	programs,	as	
the	 recipients	 are	 those	 that	 would	 most	 likely	 bear	 any	 externalities	 from	 these	 operations.	
Although	 these	 companies	 have	 enacted	 welfare	 programs	 in	 the	 immediate	 vicinity	 of	 their	
respective	 oil	 terminals	 and	 pipelines,	 there	 are	 no	 clear	 definitions	 of	 exactly	how	 far	 out	and	
exactly	 who	 constitutes	 the	 surrounding	 communities.	 Further,	 these	 programs	 do	 not	 span	
contiguous	space	along	the	offshore	pipelines,	but	rather	they	occur	in	select	enclaves.	Contractors	
and	sub-contractors,	although	indispensable	to	oil	projects,	are	not	obliged	to	contribute	funding	
or	assist	in	CSR	efforts.	
	 Pipeline	construction	from	oil	terminals	have	been	shown	to	cause	negative	environmental	
and	 social	 impacts,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	 violations	 arising	 from	 the	 Yadana	 and	 Shwe	 pipeline	
constructions	 (Arakan	 Oil	Watch,	 2012)	 (EarthRights,	 2004)	 (Doe	 v.	 Unocal	 Case	 History,	 2012).	
However,	according	to	an	onshore	CSR	manager,	once	the	pipeline	is	established	it	does	not	cause	
as	severe	an	impact	as	an	onshore	operation	because	the	extraction	occurs	at	sea,	miles	from	any	
communities.	This	assertion	was	confirmed	by	several	CSR	managers	of	offshore	and	onshore	sites.	
Even	so,	many	company	representatives	expressed	the	desire	to	give	back	some	of	the	wealth.	One	
manager	 in	particular,	“[feels]	 that	the	country	needs	help,”	and	this	company	has	subsequently	
created	extensive	regional	projects.	 	
																																																								
29	 According	to	several	difference	sources,	Chevron	has	created	a	CSR	program	which	funds	underprivileged	
youths	 in	 the	 Tanintharyi	 region.	 I	 was	 unable	 to	 secure	 an	 interview	 with	 Chevron,	 and	 there	 is	 no	
information	about	this	program	online.	However,	I	include	Chevron’s	community	program	within	the	analysis	
of	 offshore	 operators	 because	 Chevron	 inherited	 many	 of	 the	 community	 issues	 passed	 down	 from	 the	
Unocal	law	suit,	and	currently	owns	28.3%	of	the	Yadana	pipeline.	
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None	of	 the	 interviewed	companies,	 except	Daewoo,	provided	 specific	boundaries	 for	 their	
zone	of	responsibility.	In	fact,	Petronas	and	Total	explained	that	they	are	expanding	their	programs	
to	 include	other	 villages	 beyond	 the	 region	 immediately	 surrounding	 the	 pipeline	 (the	 pipelines	
have	 not	 been	 extended).	 They	 also	 fund	 programs	 across	 the	 country.	 For	 instance,	 Petronas	
created	several	education	funds	and	contributes	to	a	wildlife	reserve	outside	Yangon,	and	Total	has	
funded	programs	 ranging	 from	musical	 concerts	 in	 Yangon	 to	 clinics	 in	 several	 states	 across	 the	
country.	But	none	of	these	acts	of	philanthropy	have	any	geographic	link	to	their	operations.	 	
Per	their	PSC,	Total,	Petronas,	and	PTTEP	are	obliged	to	create	community	programs	along	the	
Yadana,	Yetagun,	and	Zawtika	parallel	pipelines.	I	received	conflicting	reports	on	the	coordination	
of	 these	 shared	CSR	efforts.	 From	my	 interviews,	 it	 became	apparent	 that	 the	other	 companies	
tend	to	piggyback	onto	Total’s	network	of	CSR	programs.	All	partners	(such	as	Nippon	JX,	Chevron,	
and	 MOGE)	 will	 contribute	 funding,	 but	 Total	 is	 the	 primary	 executor.	 Total’s	 and	 Petronas’	
programs	have	a	long	history	in	Myanmar,	since	the	early	1990’s,	and	were	recently	applauded	as	
the	model	of	CSR	by	none	other	than	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi.	Researchers	described	Total	and	Petronas’	
social	 work	 along	 the	 pipelines	 as	 “comprehensive.”	 It	 is	 unclear	 how	 far	 out,	 in	 terms	 of	
communities	and	distance,	social	responsibility	extends,	as	there	are	several	conflicting	geographic	
delineations.	 	
Daewoo	 defines	 its	 geographic	 span	 of	 responsibility	 solely	 in	 the	 region	 immediately	
surrounding	the	terminal	on	Kyauk	Phyu	Island.	Given	that	Daewoo	is	the	current	operator	of	the	
entire	Shwe	Project,	with	a	51%	stake,30	 I	had	assumed	this	meant	Daewoo	is	responsible	for	the	
geographic	 length	of	 the	Shwe	project	 (from	Kyauk	Phyu	oil	 terminal	and	Sino-Myanmar	parallel	
pipelines	 to	 the	 refinery	 in	 Kunming).	However,	 two	Chinese	 companies	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
social	programs	and	community	compensations	along	the	pipelines.	Daewoo	does	not	regard	itself	
as	responsible	for	the	O&G	transport	or	social	programs	beyond	the	oil	meters	on	the	Kyauk	Phyu.	
Accordingly,	it	has	built	hospitals	and	schools	on	the	island.	Daewoo	maintains	it	will	consult	with	
all	partners	before	enacting	a	social	program	(usually	in	the	form	of	a	donation	ceremony,	or	the	
construction	 of	 a	 hospital/school).	 	 Other	 partners	 contribute	 funding	 towards	 programs,	 but	 I	
was	not	given	a	clear	number,	estimate,	or	method	for	these	transactions.	Like	Total	and	Petronas,	
Daewoo	also	funds	programs	that	have	no	geographic	link	to	its	Shwe	operation.	 	
Two	Chinese	companies,	SEAGP	and	SEACOP,	share	the	responsibility	to	enact	social	programs	
along	the	Shwe	pipelines	(Sino-Myanmar	pipelines).	No	other	company	was	able	to	provide	exact	
information	about	the	CSR	programs	from	these	two	companies,	and	I	was	unable	to	find	updated	
contact	information	to	speak	with	company	representatives.	Even	some	of	their	partners	“did	not	
know	much	detail”	about	the	companies	or	their	CSR	programs.	 	
I	interviewed	an	Asian	company	that	operates	several	blocks	in	the	Bay	of	Bengal.	It	regarded	
CSR	 as	 more	 of	 a	 function	 of	 human	 resources	 (HR)	 and	 benefits	 for	 company	 employees	 in	
Yangon.	This	company,	similar	to	others	extracting	from	the	Myanmar	coast,	does	not	have	fully	
developed	 community	 CSR	 programs.	 Like	 Daewoo	 and	 the	 two	 companies	 along	 the	
Sino-Myanmar	pipelines,	it	would	construct	buildings	upon	request	-	such	as	a	school	or	a	hospital.	
Both	CNPC	and	CNOOC	enact	programs	and	constructions	that	are	proximate	to	their	operations.	 	
In	conclusion,	offshore	operators	such	as	Total,	Chevron,	Petronas,	PTTEP,	CNPC,	CNOOC,	and	
Daewoo	are	obliged	to	enact	programs	close	to	their	zones	of	operation.	This	creates	a	geographic	
link	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 obligatory	 community	 programs,	 or	 rather	 a	 zone	 of	 responsibility.	
Community	 programs	 are	 created	 either	 along	 operational	 pipelines,	 or	 at	 the	 site	 of	 an	 oil	
terminal.	 Although	 the	 offshore	 rigs	 are	 far	 from	 the	 communities,	 the	 onshore	 pipelines	 run	
through	 communities	 and	 paddy	 fields.	 The	most	 destructive	 and	 intrusive	 aspect	 of	 petroleum	
extraction	occurs	at	sea	-	miles	from	communities.	None	of	the	companies,	except	one,	delineated	
their	regional	zone	of	responsibility	 in	specific	terms.	Most	used	vague	terms	to	demarcate	their	
arena	for	CSR.	Although	aid	and	welfare,	broadly	speaking,	are	considered	to	be	beneficial	aspects	
																																																								
30	 Other	 partners	 in	 the	 Shwe	 project	 include	 India’s	 ONGC	Videsh	 (17%),	 India’s	 GAIL	 (8.5%),	 Korea	Gas	
(8.5%),	and	MOGE	(15%).	
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of	a	company,	 it	 is	a	highly	political	decision	as	to	who	does	and	does	not	receive	such	benefits.	
More	ethnographic	research	is	needed	to	fully	appreciate	how	oil	aid	is	received	in	these	zones.	
An	 offshore	 CSR	manager	 acknowledged,	 “When	 we	 are	 talking	 about	 [responsibility],	 the	
onshore	pipeline	doesn’t	really	affect	the	community.	But	we	will	affect	some	fishermen	when	we	
work	offshore.”	She	went	on	to	explain	that	some	community	members	on	land	were	affected	by	
the	 pipeline,	 but	 this	 was	 not	 significant.	 Even	 those	 working	 for	 monitoring	 agencies	 have	
mentioned	the	positive	 impacts	of	select	offshore	CSR	programs.	Essentially,	after	the	pipeline	 is	
constructed	 there	no	 longer	 is	 a	 strong	need	 to	 create	CSR	programs	 that	would	mitigate	 social	
tensions,	but	there	are	public	and	government	pressures	to	enact	 land	based	social	programs.	A	
CSR	 representative	 from	 an	 onshore	 company	mentioned	 there	were	 “less	 social	 issues	 to	 deal	
with”	for	the	offshore	CSR	managers.	She	elaborated,	“it	is	easy	to	engage	with	someone	who	isn’t	
affected	[as	they	are]	by	living	next	to	a	[onshore]	well.”	
4.1.2.	Onshore	Operators	 	
Counter	intuitively,	there	is	not	a	direct	geographic	link	for	onshore	operator	CSR	programs.	 	
Until	 2012,	 onshore	operators	were	discouraged	 by	 the	 government	 from	 creating	 external	 CSR	
programs	 in	communities	adjacent	 to	or	 living	 in	 their	onshore	blocks.	This	 is	surprising	because	
onshore	projects	are	invasive	by	nature	of	the	extraction	–	many	of	these	sites	occur	very	close	to	
village	communities	or	functioning	rice	paddies.	They	operate	dangerous	wells,	which	need	close	
monitoring	and	security.	One	would	expect,	given	the	intense	nature	of	petroleum	extraction,	that	
there	would	be	encouragement	for	a	type	of	ameliorative	CSR	plan	in	the	immediate	vicinity.	 	
	 Evidently	MOGE	 did	 not	 permit	 onshore	 operators	 to	 create	 social	 programs	 in	 the	 same	
areas	of	extraction	for	fear	of	community	riots	and	protests.	An	onshore	CSR	manager	explained	
the	logic:	since	communities	are	much	more	drastically	affected	by	onshore	operations	(there	is	an	
open	pit/well	 continuously	pumping	out	gas	or	oil	adjacent	 to	 rice	paddies	and	communities),	 it	
was	best	to	remain	entirely	disengaged.	If	there	was	engagement,	it	was	in	the	form	of	a	building	
construction,	 but	 not	 a	 sustained	 social	 program.	 This	 finding	was	 confirmed	 by	 CSR	managers,	
engineers,	and	company	directors.	However,	MOGE	is	now	open	to	active	community	engagement	
in	onshore	sites.	 	
Such	 a	 change	 in	 mindset	 takes	 time.	 As	 of	 2012,	 MPRL	 has	 made	 efforts	 to	 create	 CSR	
programs	in	the	Mann	field.	In	the	meantime	and	in	accordance	with	the	government	instructions,	
onshore	 operators	 have	 engaged	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 CSR	 initiatives	 that	 are	 distant	 from	
operations.	Parami31	 has	created	CSR	programs	in	Shan	and	Kayin	states.	These	projects	are	not	in	
proximity	to	its	operations,	which	are	west	of	Yangon.	 	 	 	
KT	 Energy,	 a	 Myanmar	 O&G	 company	 and	 joint	 operator	 with	 Russian	 company	 JSOC	
Bashneft,	 created	 the	 nonprofit	 foundation	 KT	 Care	 to	 manage	 all	 philanthropic	 activities.	 Its	
activities	 span	 the	country	and	 ranges	 from	emergency	 response	 to	capacity	building.	 It	 created	
programs	in	the	delta	region,	Rakhine	state,	as	well	as	around	Yangon.	Many	of	these	programs	are	
community	oriented	but	not	in	relation	to	the	communities	where	KT	Energy	operates.	The	KT	Care	
staff	 I	 interviewed	 were	 unaware	 of	 KT	 Energy’s	 partners	 or	 of	 its	 locales	 of	 operation.	 This	
instance	of	CSR	in	particular	highlights	the	blending	of	the	actors	involved	in	corporate	spending	on	
development	projects.	
MOGE	does	not	have	any	information	about	CSR	programs	online	and	I	was	unable	to	secure	
an	 interview	 with	 a	 current	 MOGE	 employee.	 One	 CSR	 manager	 remarked	 that	 MOGE	 would	
occasionally	build	a	school	or	pave	a	road	at	the	village’s	request.	 	 But,	as	she	emphasized,	this	is	
clearly	 nothing	 official	 or	 “well-planned.”	 Nobel	 Oil	 has	 no	 information	 online	 of	 any	 specific	
programs	in	Myanmar	and	does	not	create	CSR	programs,	although	it	does	engage	in	ad	hoc	type	
of	 philanthropies.	 I	was	 unable	 to	 find	 any	 information	 about	GoldPetrol’s	 CSR	 activity	 and	was	
unable	to	make	contact	with	the	company.	This	is	unfortunate	because	GoldPetrol	was	one	of	the																																																									
31	 Both	MPRL	and	Parami	have	received	positive	reviews	from	the	Myanmar	Center	for	Responsible	Business	
(MCRB)	for	their	efforts	on	increased	internet	transparency,	and	both	responded	to	Global	Witness’	request	
for	benefit	sharing	information.	
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four	seats	on	the	multi-stakeholder	group	board	for	the	Extractive	Industry	Transparency	Initiative	
(EITI).	 	
In	sum,	onshore	operators	generally	create	CSR	programs	without	geographic	rational,	which	
makes	sense	given	the	historical	context.	MCRB’s	reviews	indicated	that	companies	such	as	Total,	
Parami,	 and	MPRL	 are	 the	 leaders	 in	 setting	 the	 precedents	 for	 increasing	 transparency	 and/or	
creating	social	programs.	This	evolution	is	tempered	by	MOGE’s	shortcomings	in	the	CSR	effort.	As	
the	overseer	of	all	petroleum	operations,	 the	default	 local	partner	of	 international	corporations,	
and	the	centralizing	authority	for	approving	CSR	programs,	MOGE	should	be	spearheading	CSR	by	
logic.	 	 Since	CSR,	as	a	business	concept,	is	still	in	its	initial	stages	in	Myanmar,	there	is	opportunity	
and	potential	for	MOGE	to	take	the	initiative	 	 	 and	for	onshore	operators	to	install	CSR	programs	
within	their	onshore	blocks,	in	addition	to	the	randomly	placed	philanthropies.	 	
4.1.3.	Extraction	without	Development	 	
A	 significant	 number	of	 companies	 in	 the	petroleum	 industry	 do	not	 enact	 community	 CSR	
programs,	 do	 not	 have	 information	 about	 CSR	 on	 their	 websites,	 do	 not	 have	 websites,	 have	
conflicting	 contact	 information,	 and	 seem	 to	 make	 no	 effort	 to	 jump	 onto	 the	 new	 CSR	
bandwagon.	Many	 of	 these	 companies	 include	 contractors	 and	 sub-contractors	 to	 an	 oil	 or	 gas	
project	 who	 have	 no	 CSR	 obligations.	 This	 is	 not,	 legally	 speaking,	 unfitting	 because	 only	 the	
operator	 must	 assume	 programs.	 However,	 contractors,	 sub-contractors,	 catering	 services,	
security	details,	etc.	are	the	fuel	of	the	petroleum	industry.	Leaving	these	constituents	out	of	the	
CSR	 picture	 greatly	 narrows	 the	 sphere	 of	 responsibility	 in	 this	 sector.	 This	 also	 highlights	 the	
uneven	obligations	of	CSR	imposed	on	companies	in	the	industry.	
Several	of	my	interviewees	informed	me	that	their	company	just	did	not	perform	CSR.	Many	
were	 frank	about	 the	 shortcomings	of	 their	CSR	 initiatives,	and	on	multiple	occasions	 I	was	 told	
their	CSR	was	“not	enough”	by	company	representatives	from	Asian	and	Western	companies.	One	
representative	emphasized	that	I	should	not	praise	its	CSR	because,	despite	the	suggestions	of	its	
pamphlets,	the	company	never	did	any	CSR	in	Myanmar.	
The	 industry	 transforms	 social	 and	 ecological	 landscapes;	 many	 companies	 are	 accused	 of	
malpractice.	Operations	create	roads,	pipelines,	wells,	and	bridges.	Onshore	extraction	consists	of	
open	 wells	 with	 vast	 tracts	 of	 jungle	 and	 agricultural	 lands	 removed.	 Offshore	 projects	 build	
pipelines	 that	 transport	 resources	 from	the	 ‘body’	of	 the	 state	 to	 foreign	markets.	Communities	
are	given	compensations,	but	there	is	conflicting	evidence	about	the	success	and	implementation	
of	the	compensations	(Arakan	Oil	Watch,	2012)	(CNPC,	2012).	 	
4.2.	Corporate	Logic	and	External	Forces	upon	CSR	
A	spectrum	of	forces	drive	the	specifics	of	CSR	programs.	This	includes	the	global	narratives	of	
a	 company’s	 philosophy,	 the	 pressure	 from	 internationally	 acclaimed	 politicians	 and	 company	
stakeholders,	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 an	 individual	 in	 the	 company,	 and	 the	 requests	 from	 local	
communities.	The	justification	of	a	“business	case”	for	CSR	can	be	but	one	of	many	components	in	
the	CSR	undertaking.	The	previous	section	examined	the	rationale	behind	the	geographic	location	
of	 CSR.	 This	 section	 explores	 the	 specifics	 of	 CSR	 programs	 and	 discusses	 the	 implications	 of	
company	national	origins.	 	
4.2.1.	A	Spectrum	of	Influences	
The	 principles	 of	 individuals	 within	 a	 company	 can	 be	 a	 profound	 shaper	 of	 community	
programs.	For	 instance,	Parami	 focuses	on	monastic	education,	a	 traditional	aspect	of	Myanmar	
social	 fabric,	 and	 environmental	 programs	 like	 tree	 plantings.	 Its	 CSR	manager	 emphasized	 the	
importance	of	collaborating	with	local	governments.	The	company	has	detailed	information	about	
all	 CSR	 activities	 on	 its	website,	 has	public	 endorsements	of	 the	 importance	of	 CSR,	 and	 readily	
volunteered	to	coordinate	a	research	visit	to	a	community	program.	As	for	a	CSR	rationale,	several	
members	of	the	company	stressed	the	importance	of	monastic	education	in	Myanmar.	As	almost	
90%	of	the	population	is	Buddhist,	monastic	education	is	a	source	of	national	pride.	 	 Accordingly,	
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Parami	 aims	 to	 support	 one	 third	 of	 monastic	 education	 across	 the	 country.	 None	 of	 these	
programs	occurred	in	areas	of	active	operations.	
Sometimes,	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 one	 individual	 at	 a	 company	 are	 the	 key	 factor	 in	 CSR	
selections.	 A	 CSR	 manager	 for	 SMART,	 listed	 a	 string	 of	 philanthropies	 to	 which	 the	 company	
contributed.	Its	foundation,	Ray	of	Hope,	attends	to	a	range	of	hardship	tales	that	do	not	appear	to	
have	a	specific	logic.	Aside	from	strong	human	resource	policies	to	operate	in	a	“green”	fashion,	it	
has	initiated	projects	in	Shan	hills,	provides	hygiene	in	a	variety	of	cities,	supports	a	nunnery	north	
of	 Yangon,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 self-described	 acts	 of	 “token	 philanthropy.”	 Its	 CSR	 manager	
emphasized,	 “We	 want	 to	 help	 in	 any	 way	 we	 can”	 by	 gathering	 “true	 stories	 and	 true	
recommendations”	 to	 give	 out	 “assistance.”	 A	 member	 from	 their	 CSR	 team	 explained:	 “I	 get	
stories	 and	 then	 I	 decide.”	 In	 this	 case,	 CSR	 programs	 spanned	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 education	 and	
health	programs,	but	only	some	were	endorsed	because	particular	stories	appealed	to	the	central	
coordinator.	 	
Conversely,	other	CSR	managers	emphasized	the	business	case	for	their	CSR.	An	employee	at	
MPRL	articulated	that	the	company	will	no	longer	adhere	to	community	requests.	Instead,	the	CSR	
team	will	implement	thorough	research	to	determine	what	community	programs,	if	any,	could	be	
beneficial.	 Such	 programs	must	 fit	 into	 the	 company	 agenda,	 and	 are	 constrained	 by	 allocated	
budgets.	 MPRL	 self	 describes	 its	 CSR	 as	 “a	 culture	 we	 create”	 and	 is	 working	 towards	 an	
environment	 that	 adheres	 to	 international	 standards.	 In	 doing	 this,	 the	 company	 is	 trying	 to	
change	 the	 perception	 of	 CSR	 from	 “just	 philanthropy”	 to	 become	 “Transformative	 CSR.”	 As	
elaborated	 by	 MPRL	 staff,	 CSR	 and	 corporate	 activities	 are	 strategized	 and	 rationalized	 in	 the	
broader	 context	 of	 the	 company’s	 goals.32	 “Transformative	 CSR”	 is	 a	 way	 for	 a	 company	 to	
mitigate	 the	 impact	 of	 its	 activities,	 and	 to	 incorporate	 ethics	 and	 standards	 into	 everyday	
operations.33	 Yet,	such	a	turnaround	does	not	happen	in	a	short	time	span.	 	
Global	narratives	and	company	philosophies	are	another	significant	driver.	Companies	such	as	
Schlumberger	and	General	 Electric	 align	 their	 local	CSR	programs	with	 their	 global	development	
campaigns.	 Schlumberger,	 which	 has	 been	 operational	 in	 country	 for	 decades,	 implements	 CSR	
programs	which	are	in	line	with	its	worldwide	programs	such	as	SEED	and	the	Foundation	for	the	
Future	program,	an	initiative	which	provides	post-doctorate	degrees	for	women	around	the	world.	
This	company	does	not	do	‘philanthropic	gestures’	per	se,	but	rather	focuses	on	training	Myanmar	
individuals	 to	 be	 successful	 professionals	 through	 its	 Human	 Capital	 Development	 programs.	
Further,	Schlumberger	regards	its	R&D	funding	as	its	greatest	contribution.34	 Increased	technology	
and	 innovation	 is	 much	 needed,	 given	 a	 global	 shift	 towards	 using	 unconventional	 petroleum	
sources.	 Additionally,	 Schlumberger	 engages	 in	 multi-scale	 projects	 in	 country:	 it	 coordinates	
university	 career	 talks,	 donated	 Wi-Fi	 infrastructure	 to	 Yangon	 Technological	 University,	
implemented	 a	 safe	 driving	 program,	 hosted	 engineering	 seminaries,	 and	 provides	 emergency	
relief	aid.	Schlumberger	and	SMART	readily	invited	me	to	participate	in	some	of	their	external	CSR	
projects.	
General	Electric	only	began	regional	operations	in	2012,	yet	has	committed	seven	million	USD	
to	 CSR	 programs.	 All	 endeavors	 fit	 into	 their	 broader	 social	 objectives	 to	 actively	 change	 the	
“healthcare	 landscapes,”	enhance	the	“energy	architecture,”	and	promote	the	“human	capacity”	
of	Myanmar	(General	Electric,	2013).	Among	a	myriad	of	CSR	 initiatives,	GE	focuses	on	maternal	
health,	provides	equipment	and	tools	to	major	hospitals,	invests	in	leadership	training	and	rule	of	
law,	and	has	installed	two	aero-derivative	gas	turbines.	Such	development	goals	are	not	addressed	
by	other	companies.	 In	an	interview	with	General	Electric’s	country	director,	he	emphasized	that	
providing	electricity	to	Myanmar	citizens	is	a	primary	social	goal,	and	thus	he	works	with	different	
																																																								
32	 If	the	donation	of	a	school	or	hospital	does	not	fit	into	the	business	rational	of	the	company,	MPRL	will	not	
oblige.	 	
33	 The	company	does	not	have	a	history	of	Environmental	Impact	Assessments,	Social	Impact	Assessments,	
or	revenue	transparency.	
34	 Schlumberger	spends	1.2	to	1.3	billion	dollars	a	year	on	R&D.	
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ministries	to	realize	this	challenging	objective.	This	 is	of	particular	significance	given	that	roughly	
30%	of	the	population	has	access	to	electricity	(U.S.	Campaign	for	Burma,	2012).	 	
Unlike	operators	of	blocks,	companies	such	as	General	Electric,	Schlumberger,	and	SMART	do	
not	have	a	contractual	obligation	to	a	particular	geography.	Accordingly,	they	envision	their	CSR	on	
a	 broader,	 nationwide	 scale.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 locally	 placed	 programs	 that	 align	 with	 the	
company’s	 global	 campaigns,	 oilfield	 service	 companies	 accomplish	 CSR	 in	 another	 fashion.35	
Instead	of	a	community	program,	several	companies	expressed	that	an	important	responsibility	is	
to	 hire	 Myanmar	 nationals	 (80%	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Schlumberger,	 91%	 for	 Halliburton,	 100%	 for	
General	Electric).	They	all	emphasized	that	their	strongest	social	commitment	is	to	build	up	higher	
level	 education	 to	 lay	 a	 foundation	 for	more	Myanmar	 professionals.	 Accordingly,	 they	 provide	
professional	training	and	assistance	to	local	universities.	 	
Companies	 can	 adhere	 to	 community	 requests,	 although	 community	 expectations	 and	
corporate	intention	can	be	misaligned.	Such	an	impetus	for	CSR	creation	is	thus	contingent	upon	
the	local	geography	and	communities.	Companies	such	as	Nobel	Oil36	 and	CNOOC	will	provide	ad	
hoc	assistance	to	those	in	their	area	of	operation.	Such	impromptu	social	works	range	from	hiring	
locals	 for	 “odd	 jobs”	 to	providing	 short	 term	medical	 assistance.	 In	 several	 interviews,	 company	
staff	described	the	difficulty	in	wading	through	community	“needs”	and	“wants.”	 	
Further,	 corporate	 understandings	 of	 responsibility	 and	 community	 relationships	 can	 be	
shaped	by	local	NGO	groups	and	activists.	Total,	Petronas,	and	PTTEP	have	engaged	with	ERI	and	
local	communities	with	respect	to	programs	along	the	Yadana	pipeline.	Correspondingly,	Daewoo	
and	 CNPC	 engage	 with	 Arakan	 Oil	Watch	 and	 Shwe	 Gas	Movement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	
companies	do	not	perform	external	CSR	programs	because	they	regard	CSR	as	more	of	a	duty	to	
their	company	employees	in	the	form	of	human	resources.	
Although	MOGE	is	the	operator	for	many	blocks	and	has	centralized	control	and	management	
over	 profits	 and	 projects,	 MOGE	 does	 not	 engage	 in	 CSR	 other	 than	 to	 construct	 facilities	 per	
request	 of	 a	 community.	 MOGE	 is	 the	 centralizing	 and	 coordinating	 force	 for	 oil	 affiliated	
investments	 and	 social	 developments.	 Several	 sources	 mentioned	 that	 all	 company	 endeavors	
(ranging	from	pipeline	construction	to	community	program	creation)	must	be	run	through	MOGE.	
At	times,	companies	partnered	with	MOGE	will	create	CSR	programs	and	push	for	higher	standards	
of	operation,	but	this	is	partner	dependent	and	does	not	appear	to	be	a	common	request.	 	
External	 forces	 such	 as	 internationally	 acclaimed	politicians	 and	 company	 stakeholders	 also	
influence	 corporate	 activity.	 Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi	 and	 Hillary	 Clinton’s	 plea	 for	 inclusive	 and	
responsible	 growth	 is	 a	 fundamental	 call	 for	 corporations	 to	 not	 only	 enact	 programs	 of	 social	
responsibility	but	also	to	structure	business	endeavors	in	a	sustainable	manner.	Until	very	recently,	
governments	and	corporations	collectively	divested	 in	Myanmar	 in	reaction	to	alleged	corporate	
malpractices.	 Total	 and	 Chevron	 were	 harshly	 criticized	 in	 their	 home	 nations.	 Public	 activism	
culminated	 in	 years	 of	 litigation.	 Yet,	 the	 corporate	 “shaming”	 continues.	 Epstein	 &	 Barclay	
examined	 the	 cognitive	 dissonance	 in	 inter-state	 “green	 shaming”	 and	 how	 such	 environmental	
shaming	can	be	used	as	a	foreign	policy	tactic	(Epstein	&	Barclay,	2013).	 	
	 In	addition	to	pressure	from	public	figures,	company	stakeholders	can	encourage	changes	in	
corporate	 activity.	 A	 recent	 copy	 of	 Chevron’s	 2014	 Proxy	 Statement	 (available	 online)	 includes	
multiple	 stakeholder	 requests	 for	 Chevron	 to	 properly	 address	 environmental	 impact	 and	
humanitarian	violence	in	association	with	the	company’s	conduct.	Proxy	statements	are	required	
company	 statements	 when	 soliciting	 shareholder	 votes.	 The	 stakeholders	 described	 Chevron’s	
current	 country	 selection	as	 “opaque”	and	 commented	 that	Chevron	does	business	 in	 countries	
with	“controversial	human	rights	 records”	 (Chevron,	2014).	Although	the	directors	 responded	to	
such	 criticisms	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 each	 page	 with	 the	 comment	 “[y]our	 Board	 unanimously																																																									
35	 Most	oilfield	companies	emphasized	the	importance	of	R&D	investments	as	a	responsibility	to	the	entire	
world.	Although	Halliburton	and	Weatherford	do	have	global	CSR	initiatives,	they	do	not	yet	have	external	
CSR	programs	in	Myanmar.	
36	 However,	 Nobel	 Oil,	 does	 not	 create	 extensive	 community	 CSR	 programs,	 partly	 because	 there	 is	 no	
community	to	speak	of	in	the	jungle.	
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recommends	that	you	vote	AGAINST	this	proposal,”	the	Proxy	Statement	is	nevertheless	significant	
as	 it	 voices	 concerns	 that	 had	 been	 entirely	 absent	 from	 Chevron’s	 public	 relationship	 with	
Myanmar.	
In	her	study	of	mining	in	Indonesia,	Welker	 learned	that	Western	companies,	as	opposed	to	
their	Asian	 counterparts,	were	more	often	 targeted	by	NGOs	 and	 activists	 for	 corporate	 reform	
and	CSR	creation	(Welker,	2014).	This	insight	holds	true	in	the	case	of	EarthRights’	activism	against	
Total	 and	 Chevron.	 ERI	 staff	 remarked	 that	 they	 specifically	 targeted	 Total	 and	 Unocal	 (now	
Chevron),	 rather	 than	 file	 charges	 against	 the	 Asian	 partners	 PTTEP	 and	 MOGE,	 because	 they	
assumed	that	the	two	Western	companies	would	be	more	likely	to	respond	to	the	NGO’s	calls	to	
alter	corporate	behavior.	Total	has	responded	to	most	of	ERI’s	campaigns.	Although	Chevron	has	
no	online	documentation,	my	interviewers	suggest	it	continues	to	be	responsive	to	NGO	requests.	 	
4.3.	Uneven	Obligations	in	the	Oilfield	 	
There	are	several	uneven	expectations	and	obligations	directed	at	companies	 in	 this	sector.	
First,	it	is	the	operator	that	is	expected	to	create	and	sustain	community	CSR	programs,	despite	the	
fact	 that	 there	 are	 dozens	 of	 companies	 involved	 in	 any	 one	 operation.	 Contractors	 and	
subcontractors	 (e.g.	 oilfield	 service	 companies)	 are	 not	 expected	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 initiative.	
Second,	 although	 operators	 of	 onshore	 and	 offshore	 projects	maintain	 that	 partners	 contribute	
funding	 to	 all	 CSR,	 there	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 systematic	 method	 for	 this.	 Third,	 certain	
corporations	experience	more	public	scrutiny	than	others.	 	
4.3.1	The	Operators	 	
Project	contractors	and	sub-contractors	are	not	expected	to	create	community	programs,	as	
they	 are	 not	 operators.	 I	 found	 this	 a	 surprising	 revelation,	 having	 initially	 assumed	 that	 all	
constituents	of	a	project	would	engage	in	at	least	some	sort	of	CSR.	These	companies	are	integral	
components	of	resource	extraction	in	Myanmar,	providing	services	ranging	from	drilling	the	pits,	to	
exploring	for	petroleum,	and	to	housekeeping	and	catering	services	for	workers	on	rigs.	However,	
some	 oilfield	 service	 companies	 such	 as	 Smart	 and	 Schlumberger	 actively	 engage	 in	 CSR.	 Their	
community	 programs	 are	 found	 in	 random	 villages	 or	 are	 embedded	 HR	 strategies	 within	 a	
respective	company.	 	
Although	many	operators	emphasized	they	received	funding	from	their	partners	to	enact	CSR,	
the	 responsibility	 to	 organize,	 coordinate	 and	 sustain	 CSR	 programs	 falls	 upon	 the	 operator.	
Managers	 and	 other	 corporate	 staff,	 stressing	 the	 importance	 of	 development	 initiatives,	
mentioned	their	companies	would	donate	ad	hoc	to	select	programs.	Sometimes	this	meant	they	
donated	 to	 a	 partner’s	 program,	 while	 other	 times	 this	 meant	 that	 they	 would	 donate	 to	
unaffiliated	companies	with	which	they	do	not	conduct	business,	but	they	found	the	CSR	initiative	
impressive.	 Although	 this	 sounds	 like	 an	 excellent	 proposal,	 my	 interview	 with	 Global	 Witness	
expressed	 concerns	 that	 such	 donations	 to	 other	 companies’	 CSR	 programs	 would	 not	 leave	 a	
transparent	money	trail.	 	
4.3.2.	No	Media	for	the	“Cowboys”	 	
In	the	international	spot	light,	large	scale	operators	bear	the	brunt	of	criticisms	as	indicated	by	
Du	and	Vieira	(Du	&	Vieira,	2012).	They	found	that	larger	oil	corporations	such	as	BP	and	Chevron	
face	harsher	criticism	relative	to	smaller	oil	corporations,	a	trend	I	also	discovered	in	my	research.	
Total,	Chevron,	Daewoo,	and	large	Chinese	companies	bear	the	brunt	of	social	and	environmental	
criticism.	 Organizations	 such	 as	 EarthRights	 and	 Arakan	 Oil	 Watch	 have	 launched	 detailed	
investigations	 to	 the	 Yadana	 and	 Shwe	 Projects,	 respectively.	 However,	 there	 are	 no	 detailed	
accounts	of	the	less	well	known	onshore	and	offshore	operators	or	contractors.	 	
Smaller	 and	 less	 well	 known	 “cowboy	 companies,”	 escape	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 media,	 as	
described	 by	 the	 director	 of	 a	 major	 oilfield	 service	 company.	 This	 director	 criticized	 the	 vast	
number	 of	 such	 “cowboy	 companies”	 whose	 disregard	 of	 operational	 standards	 has	 usually	
remained	 out	 of	 the	 international	 limelight.	 In	 particular,	 he	 cited	 the	 smaller	 Indian,	 Russian,	
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Korean,	 and	 Chinese	 companies.	 During	 our	 conversation,	 he	 emphasized	 that,	 “everyone	 is	
watching”	so	Western	companies	must	adhere	to	stakeholder	requests,	and	that	such	companies	
must	publicize	all	activities.	Although	these	comments	came	from	an	oilfield	service	director,	it	is	
generally	contractors	and	subcontractors	that	evade	international	media	and	NGO	scrutiny.	 	
4.3.3.	Western	Targets	 	
Further,	activist	organizations	usually	target	Western	corporations,	such	as	Total	and	Chevron,	
over	their	Asian	counter	parts,	such	as	PTTEP	and	MOGE.	This	 is	evident	from	the	series	of	 legal	
cases	 launched	against	Total	and	Chevron	by	EarthRights,	as	well	as	 from	the	 list	of	publications	
detailing	 alleged	 corporate	malpractices.	 ERI	 staff	 remarked	 that	 they	 specifically	 targeted	 Total	
and	Unocal	(now	Chevron),	rather	than	file	charges	against	the	Asian	partners	PTTEP	and	MOGE,	
because	they	assumed	that	the	two	Western	companies	would	be	more	 likely	to	respond	to	the	
NGO’s	calls	to	alter	corporate	behavior.	Although	EarthRights	includes	Petronas,	PTTEP,	and	MOGE	
in	their	analysis,	most	of	their	publication	titles	are	aimed	at	changing	the	corporate	activities	of	
the	Western	companies.	Titles	such	as	Total	 Impact,	Getting	It	Wrong,	The	True	Cost	of	Chevron,	
and	The	Human	Cost	of	Energy	(think	Chevron’s	slogan,	“Human	Energy”)	are	retorts	to	corporate	
slogans	or	publications.	However,	this	trend	is	not	always	the	case.	As	for	the	Shwe	Project,	Arakan	
Oil	 Watch	 and	 the	 Shwe	 Gas	 Movement	 have	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	 major	 company	
partners	(South	Korean,	Indian,	and	Chinese	companies).	These	organizations	have	created	a	series	
of	publications	similar	to	those	of	EarthRights.	 In	both	cases,	the	contractors	and	subcontractors	
are	not	usually	mentioned.	 	
5.	Conclusions	
5.1.	Concluding	the	Architects’	Logic	 	
When	examining	the	geography	of	projects,	it	is	evident	that	offshore	and	onshore	operators	
and	 contractors,	 engage	 with	 communities	 (at	 some	 scale)	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 welfare	 and	
philanthropy.	During	 the	course	of	my	 fieldwork,	 I	was	never	given	a	precise	definition	 for	what	
does	and	does	not	constitute	the	surrounding	 ‘communities,’	or	how	far	 (in	terms	of	geographic	
distance)	 their	 zone	 of	 responsibility	 extends.	 For	 the	most	 part,	 many	 programs	 appear	 to	 be	
randomly	 selected	and	administrated.	The	vicinity	of	 responsibility	appears	 to	be	entirely	up	 for	
interpretation	 to	 individual	 operators.	 Most	 participants	 answered	 in	 vague	 language,	 and	
indicated	that	the	geographic	span	of	assumed	obligation	is	subject	to	change	over	the	years	and	is	
dependent	on	the	company’s	leadership.	
The	 internal	 logic	and	global	 forces	of	corporate	entities	 further	determine	how	CSR	can	be	
shaped.	Taking	 into	consideration	all	of	the	specific	company	rationales,	 it	becomes	evident	that	
Western	 and	 Burmese	 corporations	 tend	 to	 be	more	 engaged	 in	 the	 CSR	 effort.	 Pressure	 from	
respective	 national	 countries	 can	 encourage	 a	 greater	 adherence	 to	 regulatory	 standards	 and	
encourages	a	more	active	 role	 in	external	CSR	programs.	The	court	cases	 launched	against	Total	
and	 Chevron,	 in	 Belgium	 and	 the	 U.S.	 respectively,	 catapulted	 their	 corporate	 activities	 to	 the	
public	and	encouraged	a	working	relationship	with	NGOs	and	local	communities.	Newcomers	such	
as	 General	 Electric	 and	 old-timers	 such	 as	 Schlumberger	 align	 programs	 in	Myanmar	with	 their	
global	 initiatives.	Although	disparate	 in	CSR	 implementation,	Burmese	companies	such	as	MPRL,	
Smart	Technical,	and	Parami	organize	CSR	efforts	 in	 individualized	manners	 in	accordance	with	a	
set	of	local	and	personal	values.	In	addition	to	external	forces,	the	individual	corporate	philosophy	
shapes	the	particular	direction	of	social	programs.	 	
Asian	 companies,	 with	 the	 notable	 exception	 of	 Petronas,	 have	 created	 less	 extensive	
programs	 to	 date.	 Both	Asian	 and	 Eurasian	 companies	 usually	 respond	 to	 particular	 community	
requests	and	regard	CSR	as	philanthropic	constructions	instead	of	embedded	corporate	strategies.	
Further,	 there	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 system	 to	 publicize	 these	 actions.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	
entirely	unsurprising.	An	analyst	from	the	Business	and	Human	Rights	Centre	mentioned	that	Asian	
corporations	do	not	have	a	history	of	publicizing	their	corporate	activities	and	do	not	see	the	need	
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to	respond	to	media	requests.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	companies	do	not	create	programs	or	
adhere	to	standards,	but	that	there	 is	 less	of	a	precedent	to	engage	with	the	public.	This	has,	 in	
part,	resulted	in	the	stereotype	that	Chinese	and	other	Asian	companies	are	“secretive,”	“shady,”	
and	“elusive.”	In	response,	an	engineer	from	an	Asian	company	stated	that	“sincere	efforts	need	
no	headlines.”	
A	 company’s	 operational	 scope	 further	 complicates	 the	 CSR	 issue.	 In	 short,	 oilfield	 service	
companies	(drilling,	security,	catering,	etc.)	are	all	vital	to	petroleum	projects.	Yet,	they	are	rarely	
mentioned	 as	 responsible	 agents.	 Nor	 are	 they	 the	 usual	 targets	 of	 NGOs.	 Less	 well	 known	
corporations	can	escape	the	attention	of	 the	media,	and	they	do	not	appear	 to	be	pressured	by	
stakeholders,	 nor	 are	 they	 on	 the	 public	 forefront.	 There	 are	 concerns	 with	 methods	 of	 CSR	
funding	 by	 project	 partners,	 and	 there	 is	 an	 uneven	 level	 of	 scrutiny	 by	 the	media	 and	 activist	
organizations.	 By	 incorporating	 contractors	 and	 partners	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 responsibility,	 this	
further	expands	but	also	convolutes	the	boundaries	of	responsibility.	 	
5.2	Criticisms	&	Challenges	
Members	from	non-profit	and	research	organizations	expressed	that	CSR	should	incorporate	
not	only	all	components	of	corporate	accountability,	but	also	have	social	programs	that	go	beyond	
philanthropy.	 Accordingly	 in	 an	 ideal	 world,	 true	 corporate	 accountability	 would	 include	 full	
economic	 disclosure,	 such	 as	 revenue	 transparency	 and	 public	 information	 about	 beneficial	
ownership,	complete	disclosure	of	environmental	and	social	impacts	in	the	form	of	published	EIAs	
and	SIAs37,	and	would	integrate	operation	standards	of	“doing	no	harm.”	This	would	include	a	strict	
legal	 component;	 however,	 this	 is	 ambitious	 in	 all	 country	 settings,	 even	 countries	 with	 strict	
standards.	It	would	further	include	robust	HR	measures	of	equal	and	fair	pay	and	compensation	for	
company	workers.	 	
There	 is	also	a	 temporal	aspect	 to	 this	category.	According	to	the	directors	of	 two	different	
nonprofits,	none	of	the	recently	operational	companies	have	enough	of	a	track	record	to	warrant	
any	 praise.	 Although	 time	 will	 tell,	 companies	 including	 General	 Electric	 and	 BG	 Group38	 were	
mentioned	in	numerous	interviews	as	hopeful	candidates	for	such	type	of	responsible	investment.	
At	 the	moment,	most	 CSR	 praise	 is	 reserved	 for	 Total	 and	 Petronas’	 programs,	 possibly	 in	 part	
because	they	have	been	involved	with	communities	for	over	20	years.	 	
One	researcher	 I	 interviewed	believed	that	companies	needed	to	take	 into	account	national	
problems	rather	than	focus	on	select	community	grievances.	He	disregarded	the	corporate	outline	
from	 Business	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Resource	 Centre	 as	 the	 way	 to	 move	 onwards.	 Instead,	 he	
maintained	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 “deep	 and	 thorough”	 understanding	 of	 legal	 accountability	 and	
Myanmar’s	 contradicting	 laws.	 The	 lack	 of	 regulation	 implementations	 and	 challenges	 from	 the	
“leftover	dictatorship	bureaucracy”	must	be	addressed	by	corporations,	in	addition	to	addressing	
issues	 of	 “compensations	 and	 systematic	 corruption.”	 State	 taxes	 should	 be	 paid	 (and	 closely	
monitored)	 so	 that	 the	government	may	build	up	and	 support	 its	own	communities.	Addressing	
labour	rights,	including	fair,	equal,	and	timely	pay,	is	also	a	key	component.	He	concluded	there	is	
“promise”	 of	 such	 a	 system	 from	 those	 recently	 awarded	 blocks,	 but	 others	 have	 a	 more	
cautionary	approach	to	these	corporate	entities	given	that	the	gas	reserves	are	still	unknown.	All	of	
these	 sentiments	 were	 echoed	 in	 my	 interviews	 with	 personnel	 from	 the	 World	 Bank,	 Global	
Witness,	 and	 Revenue	 Transparency.	 Two	 researchers	 maintained	 that,	 given	 the	 landscape	 of	
problems,	 companies	 have	 a	 responsibility	 not	 to	 invest	 until	 systematic	 issues	 (such	 as	 land	
ownership,	tax	allocations)	are	properly	addressed	by	the	state.	Relatedly,	the	question	posed	by	
Holliday,	“can	profits	and	principles	be	secured	 in	 tandem?”	 in	The	Yadana	Syndrome,	obviously	
does	not	have	a	clear	answer	(Holliday,	2005).	 	
I	 conducted	 an	 informal	 interview	 with	 a	 professor	 who	 focuses	 on	 transnational	 conflict,	
corporations,	and	the	development	of	human	rights	in	Myanmar.	He	mused	that	much	of	the	CSR	
in	Myanmar	is	little	more	than	a	public	front	which	he	likened	to	“Public	Social	Responsibility.”	It																																																									
37	 Myanmar	published	its	ESIA	regulations	in	2015,	thus	after	the	timeframe	of	this	report.	
38	 BG	was	acquired	by	Shell	after	the	timeframe	of	this	report.	 	
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can	 be	 difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 to	 verify	 the	 proclamations	 of	 CSR.	 Boycotting	 a	 select	 oil	
company	 for	moral	 reasons,	 he	 elaborated,	 does	 not	work	 in	 the	 same	 fashion	 as	 boycotting	 a	
particular	clothing	or	electronics	brand.	This	is	for	two	reasons.	First,	our	great	dependency	on	oil	
and	gas	as	an	energy	 source	and	a	building	block	 for	a	 range	of	needs	 (medical	 supplies,	 soaps,	
battery	cases,	fertilizers,	synthetic	rubber…)	hampers	any	comprehensive	rejection	of	a	particular	
corporation.	 Secondly,	 oil	 and	 gas	 products	 are	 pooled	 by	 corporations.	 Thus,	 boycotting	 one	
company	 does	 not	 necessarily	 affect	 the	 targeted	 corporation.	 He	 reasoned	 this	 is	 why	 the	
underlying	structures	of	oil	extraction	and	transport	have	not	been	changed	despite	the	activism	
against	petroleum	extraction,	production,	and	 transportation.	 In	 the	meantime,	companies	have	
embarked	on	“extreme	PR	adventures…	and	then	CSR.”	 	
The	 director	 of	 an	 environmental	 NGO	 emphasized	 the	 need	 for	 a	 “serious	 conversation”	
about	CSR	 instead	of	 a	 “shouting	match	between	ultra-moral	 eco	warriors	 against	 super	 evil	 oil	
managers,	with	those	of	a	less	absolutist	stance	silenced	in	between.”	Activists	such	as	Arakan	Oil	
Watch’s	 director	 firmly	 believe	 that	 there	 should	 be	 absolutely	 no	 international	 corporate	
engagement	until	corruption	and	rights	abuses	are	addressed.	However,	given	the	momentum	of	
the	petroleum	industry,	this	encourages	an	absolutist-only	platform	for	discussion	on	investment.	 	
5.3	Implications	
This	paper	explores	the	assumed	spheres	of	corporate	responsibility,	but	exact	delineations	of	
corporate	 obligations	 continue	 to	 remain	 elusive.	 Ultimately,	 the	 geography	 of	 operations,	 the	
national	 origin	 of	 a	 company,	 and	 the	 type	 of	 company	 operations	 can	 be	 significant	 factors	 in	
shaping	 a	 corporation’s	 understanding	 of	 ‘responsibility’	 in	Myanmar.	 Such	 assumed	 spheres	 of	
responsibility,	 in	 a	 complex	 and	 unregulated	 setting,	 is	 simultaneously	 amorphous	 and	
quantifiable.	
As	for	geography,	offshore	operators	have	comprehensible	geographic	relationships	for	their	
community	programs,	while	onshore	operators	and	contractors	do	not.	These	rationales	are	in	line	
with	 the	 encouragement	 and	 discouragement	 from	 the	 Myanmar	 government.	 Regarding	
development	 goals,	 company	 rationales	 for	 CSR	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 and	
forces.	These	range	from	pressure	of	activist	organizations	and	international	actors,	the	Myanmar	
government,	 to	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 a	 company	 individual.	 This	 generalization	 can	 begin	 to	
answer	 the	 questions	 about	 what	 is	 means	 to	 be	 responsible,	 and	 how	 is	 this	 created	 and	
sustained?	In	short,	this	understanding	of	responsibility	is	layered	with	complexity.	 	
The	companies	I	interviewed	unanimously	expressed	their	“obligation”	to	“give	back”	and	to	
“do	 the	 right	 thing.”	 	 However,	 deciding	where	 and	 how	 to	 “give	 back”	 is	 a	multi-dimensional	
process	 filled	 with	 a	 complex	 array	 of	 justifications,	 some	 with	 seemingly	 little	 reason.	 I	 have	
demonstrated	that	petroleum	operations	radically	change	local	environments,	but	they	also	have	
the	potential	to	create	new	zones	of	development	and	welfare.	The	contours	of	responsibility	are	
complex	and	malleable,	but	have	elaborate	rationalizations	in	this	Myanmar	context.	 	
Although	 this	 research	 examines	 the	 geographic	 span	 and	 materialization	 of	 CSR	 in	 the	
petroleum	 sector,	 these	 findings	 can	 be	 applied	 beyond	Myanmar	 and	 oil-funded	 development	
projects.	 CSR	 is	 far	 more	 complex	 than	mere	 acts	 of	 corporate	 charity,	 or	 PR.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	
contemporary	 solution	 to	 global	 corporate	 malpractice	 when	 extracting	 terrestrial	 and	 marine	
resources.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 still	 undefined.	 It	 is	 a	 conventional	method	 for	 enacting	 and	 demonstrating	
‘responsibility’	to	society	as	a	whole.	However,	it	is	still	poorly	understood	and	unevenly	applied.	
Understanding	how	companies	enact	‘responsibility’	should	be	a	focus	for	research,	rather	than	be	
dismissed	as	inconsequential	and	empty.	Because,	by	looking	at	CSR,	one	is	not	merely	examining	a	
development	 project	 or	 an	 environmental	 standard.	 CSR	 fits	 into	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 the	
consequences	 arising	 from	 rapid	 globalization,	 the	 commodification	 of	 development,	 the	
performance	 of	 corporate	 morality,	 and	 the	 financial	 investments	 in	 what	 are	 referred	 to	 as	
‘extreme	contexts’	and	‘failed	states.’	
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